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FURTHERING THE ACCOUNTABILITY
PRINCIPLE IN PRIVATIZED FEDERAL
CORRECTIONS: THE NEED FOR ACCESS
TO PRIVATE PRISON RECORDS
Nicole B. Casarez*
As American prisons face unprecedented overcrowding, both the
federal and various state governments have engaged private
entrepreneurs to operate correctional facilities on a for-profit basis.
In the federal context, one overlooked consequence of prison privatization involves decreased public access to prison records. When a
federal agency delegates a public function, like the provision of
correctional services, to a priVate contractor, the agency frustrates
the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act. Prison records that
otherwise would have been available to the public become insulated
from disclosure by virtue of the contractor's nonagency status. To
safeguard prisoners' liberty interests and well-being, this Article
argues that private federal prisons must be just as accountable to
the public as public prisons. Congress should therefore enact
legislation subjecting private federal prison records to disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act as part of a comprehensive
program to monitor and oversee private prison operators.

INTRODUCTION

In the great prison privatization 1 debate, 2 both advocates and
opponents of privatizing prisons agree on the importance of

•
Assistant Professor, University of St. Thomas, Department of Communication. B.J. 1976, University of Texas; J.D. 1979, University of Texas School of Law;
M.A. 1991, University of Houston. I am grateful to Professor Sandra Guerra,
University of Houston School of Law, for reviewing and commenting on this Article.
1.
Because ofits wide range of meanings, "privatization" aptly has been described
as a "fuzzy concept.• Paul Starr, The Meaning ofPrivatization, 6 YALE L. & POL'y REV.
1, 6 (1988). In this Article, the term refers to government contracting with a private
entity to manage and operate an entire correctional facility or system. Used in this
sense, "privatization" would not include publicly operated prisons that contract out
ancillary functions, such as laundry, medical or food services, or any other involvement
by the private sector in operating prison industries.
2.
The literature on prison privatization is copious. For a sampling of the commentary on political, legal, and economic issues raised by proprietary prisons, see
PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1993) and
PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990). For a
detailed bibliography regarding private prisons, see Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531, 796-854 (1989).
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accountability. 3 As part of the criminal justice system, prisons
serve the public interest by confining, punishing, and, hopefully,
rehabilitating those convicted. Correctional facilities and their
operation affect directly the liberty interests of those incarcerated within them. If the state entrusts full management responsibilities for its prisons to private contractors, it should
ensure that these contractors in no way abuse the public trust
or prisoners' rights. 4
One often overlooked but relevant difference between the
accountability of public and private federal prisons 5 involves
public access to prison records. To illustrate this difference,
consider the following example.
Along the United States-Mexico border, summer temperatures are brutal. In its 1991 study, Prison Conditions in the
United States, 6 Human Rights Watch reported that at several
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detention
centers, detainees are forced to remain outdoors for many
hours a day in the intense heat. 7 Could an enterprising reporter demand access to INS records to document this or other

3.
See, e.g., Joan W. Allen, Use of the Private Sector in Corrections Service
Delivery, in THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN STATE SERVICE DELIVERY: EXAMPLES OF INNOVATIVE PRACTICES 13, 38-39 (The Council on State Governments & The Urban Institute
eds., 1989) (arguing that before contracting for private prison operations, a state should
design and implement an effective monitoring system); Warren I. Cikins, Privatization
of the American Prison System: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 445, 458-59 (1986) (writing that careful monitoring and strong
conflict of interest statutes are necessary to avoid corruption in private prisons);
Michael Keating, Jr., Public Over Private: Monitoring the Performance of Privately
Operated Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST, supra note
2, at 130 (positing that the contracting agency must develop clear operational standards
and effective monitoring techniques to ensure accountability); cf. CHARLES H. LOGAN,
PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PRos 210 (1990) (stating that monitoring and "motivation"
are equally important for public and private prisons).
4.
See, e.g., Mary R. Woolley, Prisons for Profit: Policy Considerations for
Government Officials, 90 DICK. L. REV. 307, 310 (1985) (stating that the government
must oversee privately operated prisons to safeguard prisoners' constitutional rights).
5.
In this Article, the terms "prisons" and "correctional facilities" are used
interchangably to refer to jails, prisons, and detention facilities. Generally, jails are
used to deta.in those convicted of minor offenses and those awaiting trial; prisons are
used to incarcerate those convicted of more serious crimes; and detention facilities
are used by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Servi'ce (INS) to confine illegal
aliens who are to be deported. See MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS
OF PRIVATE PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 63-64 (1993). Additionally, the U.S.
Marshals Service uses detention centers to house unsentenced federal detainees. See
Scott Vath, Prison Privatization Proves a Profitable Tool for Locking up Prisoners,
AM. CITY & COUNTY, Mar. 1993, at 320.
6.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1991).
7.
Id. at 98 (reporting temperatures of llO"F).
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practices at various INS facilities? Under current law, the
Freedom of Information Act8 (FOIA or the Act) allows "any
person" to gain access to federal agency records, subject to
only nine listed exemptions. 9 Therefore, the FOIA would
provi~e a means for a reporter to review INS records held at
the Krome Avenue Processing Center in Miami, but not records maintained at the El Centro Detention Center in El
Centro, California. Why the distinction? One facility is operated by the INS, 10 which, as part of the Department of Justice,
is a "federal agency" under the FOIA; 11 the other is operated
by a private contractor. 12
This hypothetical highlights an often overlooked consequence of privatizing federal 13 correctional facilities-reduced
access by the press and public to records regarding the operation of federal prisons. To protect prisoners' rights, ensure
quality care, and guard against malfeasance, private prisons
must be at least as accountable to the public as public prisons.14 When contracting with the private sector to manage its
correctional services, the federal government thus far has not
achieved this level 0£ accountability. 15
This Article explores the limited public access to private
prison records and the impact of the limitation on accountability. Part I briefly discusses the history of prison privatization, focusing on the federal experience. Part II examines how
records prepared by a private contractor would be treated
under current interpretations of the FOIA. Part III analyzes
suggested methods to ensure accountability of prison contractors, and then concludes that Congress should pass legislation
subjecting private prison records to disclosure under the FOIA.

8.
5 u.s.c. § 552 (1988).
9.
Id. § 552(a)(3). The nine exemptions allow an agency to withhold records
relating to national security, internal agency rules, matters exempted from disclosure
by other federal acts, trade secrets, inter- or intra-agency memoranda, personnel and
medical files, records compiled for law enforcement purposes, matters concerning the
operation of financial institutions, and geological information. Id. § 552(b)(l)-(9).
10. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 92.
11. 5 u.s.c. § 552(0 (1988).
12. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 66.
13. While privatization of state correctional facilities also raises concerns under
state open records acts, state law questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 67-91.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 98-105.
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I. PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS AND THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE

Private sector involvement in the operation of prisons has
made something of a comeback in recent years. Although today
incarceration often is viewed primarily as a governmental
function to be undertaken by the state, 16 historically, private
parties have played a significant role in providing correctional
services. 17
Beginning in sixteenth-century England, private jailers
commonly ran workhouses as profit-making institutions, where
prisoners paid for their keep from the money earned by their
labor. 18 During the seventeenth century, England shipped
convicts to the American colonies by allowing the transporting
merchants to market the prisoners as indentured servants. 19
In 1666, one of the first private jailers in the colonies, Raymond Stapleford, constructed a prison in Maryland in return
for 10,000 pounds of tobacco and lifetime tenure as keeper of
the facility. 20 Private entrepreneurs and reform groups continued to operate prisons in the early years of the American
nation, at a time when differences between "public" and
"private" were indistinct. 21 By the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, correctional administration generally was seen as the government's responsibility, and privately
operated correctional facilities gradually were replaced by
government-run prisons. 22
In the years before the Civil War, private entrepreneurs
began to use prisoners from public institutions as sources of
cheap, involuntary labor. 23 Although the advent of the Civil

16. See, e.g., W. James Ellison, Privatization of Corrections: A Critique and
Analysis of Contemporary Views, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 683, 696-97 (1987) ("The operation of a penal system is traditionally a state function.").
17.
SELLERS, supra note 5, at 48-51.
18. Id. at 48-49.
19.
DAVID N. AMMONS ET AL., THE OPTION OF PRISON PRIVATIZATION: A GUIDE
FOR COMMUNITY DELIBERATIONS 4 (1992).
20.
Id.
21.
Samuel J. Brakel, •privatization" in Corrections: Radical Prison Chic or
Mainstream Americana?, 14 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 4 n.7
(1988).
22.
AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 4. For a discussion of the two American
prison systems that developed during the nineteenth century, the Pennsylvania
System and the Auburn System, see SELLERS, supra note 5, at 49-50.
23. See SELLERS, supra note 5, at 50.
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War meant the end of convict leasing in parts of the South, 24
wartime destruction of prisons led some southern states to
establish programs through which prisoners were hired out to
private businesses. 25 During these years, some states, including
Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana, leased entire prisons to
private operators. 26 Both approaches frequently resulted in
graft, corruption, and the exploitation and maltreatment of
inmates. 27
By the end of the nineteenth century, a number of states had
prohibited contract prison labor; 28 however, the contracting
system persisted in some states into the twentieth century. 29
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive
order forbidding the use of convict labor on federal projects. 30
During the early to mid-twentieth century, labor unions
persuaded legislators to forbid the manufacture and sale of
prison-produced items to the public. 31 By1960, convict-leasing
programs in the states had been largely abolished, in part
because of journalists who exposed the evils of the system to
the public. 32 In the 1970s, modest prison industry programs
were viewed more as useful vocational opportunities than as
significant ways to reduce prison costs. 33
Even after 1960, however, the private sector remained involved in the corrections field, albeit in limited areas such as
medical and food services. 34 Additionally, certain "secondary"
facilities, such as juvenile homes and adult halfway houses,

24. Id.
25. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 4.
26. Id.
27. John J. Diiulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A Critical Perspective on the Private
Management of Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST,
supra note 2, at 155, 159-60. For example, Texas leased Huntsville prison to private
entrepreneurs who sold convict labor to various businesses. Inmates were mistreated
and overworked to such an extent that most did not survive more than seven years
of imprisonment, some attempted suicide, and "others maimed themselves to get out
of work or as a pathetic form of protest." Id. at 159.
28. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 50.
29. Brakel, supra note 21, at 4 n.7.
30. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
31. See Diiulio, supra note 27, at 160 (stating that pressure by unions contributed
to the decline of prison labor); cf Arie Press, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Private
Prisons in the 1980s, in PRIVATE PRISONS .AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST, supra note 2,
at 19, 20-21 (discussing the passage of"state use" laws during the Great Depression,
under which prisoner-produced products could be used only by the state).
32. Diiulio, supra note 27, at 160.
33. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
34. Brakel, supra note 21, at 4-5.
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historically have been managed and owned by private for-profit
and non-profit groups. 35 For example, the federal Bureau of
Prisons has been sending inmates to private pre-release
community treatment centers since 1965. 36 Furthermore, a
federal study reveals that, by 1983, forty-nine states had
contracted with over 1800 private firms to manage juvenile
centers accommodating approximately 31,000 youths. 37
Real controversy regarding prison privatization, however, did
not develop until the 1980s, when private entrepreneurs began
operating entire adult prisons. 38 Probably the most important
impetus for a renewed interest in private prisons was overcrowding in the public facilities. 39 According to President
Ronald Reagan's Commission on Privatization, the combined
number of federal and state inmates increased by approximately seventy-four percent between 1979 and 1986.40 Whereas
one American per thousand was imprisoned in 1970, the rate
of incarceration had tripled by 1990. 41 Although federal, state,
and local governments budgeted additional funds for corrections, they could not construct new prisons quickly or cheaply
enough to meet the demand, in part because of continuing
inflation. 42 By 1990, federal prisons were filled to more than
170% of their rated capacity,43 and forty-one states plus the
District of Columbia faced court orders or consent decrees to
improve crowded prison conditions. 44
At the same time that American prison systems confronted
unprecedented overcrowding, state and local governments
encountered fiscal pressures resulting from tax reductions,
declining federal grant monies, and general economic malaise. 45

35.
Id. at 5.
36.
Ellison, supra note 16, at 695 n.61.
37.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN IN CUSTODY:
1982/83 CENSUS OF JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1983), as
cited in Press, supra note 31, at 21. Delaware was the only state that did not utilize
any private firms for juvenile care. Id.
38.
Brakel, supra note 21, at 5.
39. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6.
40.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PRlvATIZATION, PRlvATIZATION: ToWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GoVERNMENT 146 (1988) [hereinafter REPORT ON PRIVATIZATION).
41.
AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Id. at 3.
45.
See Douglas C. McDonald, Introduction, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC
INTEREST, supra note 2, at 6-7; see also SELLERS, supra note 5, at 14-15 (suggesting
that demand for lower taxes and decreased government spending contributes to the
need for increased privatization).
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Although citizens demanded tougher penalties against criminals, the public was often unwilling to pay the higher taxes
needed to support larger prison populations. 46 Meanwhile, in
response to complaints of inadequate and costly federal programs, the Reagan administration advocated the privatization
of a wide range of government services. 47 To economically
strapped public officials looking for a way out of a hopeless
situation, prison privatization emerged as an attractive alternative.48
The federal correctional system afforded the first opportunity
for a private entrepreneur to break into the adult prison
market. In 1979, the INS began to experience overcrowding in
its facilities for illegal aliens. 49 As a result, it entered into a
cost-plus contract with Ted Nissen, a former California parole
and corrections officer who ran a halfway house for state
inmates, to utilize some ofhis facility's empty beds, 50 When the
shortage of federal beds for detainees continued, Nissen started
a for-profit private prison company known as Behavioral
Systems Southwest. 51 By1990, Behavioral Systems Southwest
operated several INS detention facilities and managed a
number of community treatment centers for the U.S. Bureau
of Prisons. 52 At that time, the INS was contracting with at
least three other private firms to operate detention centers. 53
Not surprisingly, the federal government began experimenting with privatization at what has been termed the
"shallow end" of the adult corrections system. 54 Incarcerated
only briefly while awaiting deportation, illegal aliens generally are considered low-security risks who receive little in the

46. Cikins, supra note 3, at 445-46.
47. REPORT ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 40, at xi; McDonald, supra note 45,
at 4.
48.
Cikins, supra note 3, at 446. See generally E.S. Savas, It's Time to Privatize,
19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 781 (1992)(advocating that privatization of a city government's
services would result in improved and less expensive public services, lower taxes, and
more efficient government).
49.
Press, supra note 31, at 25.
50. Id.
51.
Id.
52. · LoGAN, supra note 3, at 21-22.
53. For a sample list of privately contracted prison facilities, including INS and
Bureau of Prison detention centers, see SELLERS, supra note 5, at 65-68.
54. MICK RYAN & TONY WARD, PRIVATIZATION AND THE PENAL SYSTEM: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND THE DEBATE IN BRITAIN 27-28 (1989) (describing
"shallow end" as low-security correctional institutions such as juvenile detention
facilities and adult halfway houses).
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way of counseling or rehabilitation. 55 Another type of federal
facility requiring minimum security care, the Bureau of Prisons' pre-release community treatment centers, has been operated exclusively by private firms since 1981. 56
Following the federal example, many state governments began
to contract with private firms to manage their prisons in the
1980s. In 1986, the Marion Adjustment Center in St. Mary's,
Kentucky, became the first state prison in modern times to be
privately owned and operated. 57 Statistics prepared by the
University of Florida's Center for Studies in Criminology and
Law showed that by 1991, private entrepreneurs were running
forty-three adult prisons in fourteen states, totalling 15,232
beds. 58 According to Corrections Corporation of America (CCA),
a leading private correctional firm, by 1993 twenty private
companies managed more than 30,000 beds, representing two
percent of the total U.S. prison and jail population. 59 CCA itself
operated nineteen prisons nationwide in 1993,60 and by 1994
CCA had contracted to build and manage facilities in Arizona,
Florida, and Puerto Rico. 61
By contracting for corrections services, both state and federal
government officials hope_ to: (1) reduce prison construction and
operating costs, including the labor expenses associated with
pensions and benefits; (2) build prison facilities more quickly
and with fewer bureaucratic delays; and (3) enhance flexibility
in inmate care without the encumbrance of governmental red
tape. 62 Opponents of privatization, however, contend that:
(1) private prisons may cost more than public facilities because

55. Id. at 13.
56. Hearings on Privatization ofCorrections Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 132 (1986) (statement of Norman A. Carlson, Director of the
Bureau of Prisons).
57.
LoGAN, supra note 3, at 24. Also in 1986, Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA) unsuccessfully attempted to take over Tennessee's entire prison system.
McDonald, supra note 45, at 1. For a complete discussion ofCCA's proposal, see David
H. Folz & John M. Scheb, II, Prisons, Profits and Politics: The Tennessee Privatization
Experiment, 73 JUDICATURE 98 (1989).
58. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 26.
59. CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AMERICA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1994) [hereinafter
CCA ANNUAL REPORT] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
60. Id. at 15.
61.
CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AMERICA, 1994 FIRST QUARTER REPORT (1994) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
62.
SELLERS, supra note 5, at 41. For a comprehensive list of the arguments both
for and against prison privatization, see LoGAN, supra note 3, at 40-48.
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of hidden costs; 63 (2) quality and quantity of prison services
may decline because of economic pressures to cut corners; and
(3) by relying on private operators, the government may have
no means to provide prison services in the event of labor
strikes, operator bankruptcies, or other emergencies. 64 Additional criticisms of private prisons include political arguments,
such as the impropriety of using privatization to circumvent
voters who fail to support prison bond referenda, 65 and social
arguments, such as the claim that private prisons weaken the
authority of the state in the eyes of both the inmates and the
public. 66
Most of the social and political issues surrounding prison
privatization demonstrate the need for accountability. Critics
of what have been called "prisons for profit"67 fear that without
adequate standards of accountability, private prison operators
will have free rein to cut corners and increase their profit
63. E.g., Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation
of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 654-55 (1987) (naming additional
. contract monitoring and legal fees as examples). Some studies addressing whether
private prisons are cheaper to run than public prisons have generated inconclusive
results. See, e.g., Diiulio, supra note 27, at 156 (stating that no reliable cost data exist
comparing public and private correctional facilities); Dale K. Sechrest & David
Shichor, Corrections Goes· Public (and Private) in California, FED. PROBATION, Sept.
1993, at 3, 7 (concluding that results of a cost effectiveness study did not favor either
privately or publicly operated prisons); cf LoGAN, supra note 3, at 96 (noting that
simple cost comparisons of public and private prisons may yield inaccurate results
because they neglect such diversifying factors as location, size, and age of the
facilities).
·
Other research supports the proposition that private prisons are more cost-effective
than those operated by the state. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 19-20 (citing
reports by the National Institute of Justice and the Urban Institute). For example,
Martin Sellers compared three public prisons with three private facilities, each similar
in size, location, structure, age, inmate capacity, average daily occupancy, and
management style. Additionally, each pair of institutions offered the same quantity
and type of prison services. Sellers concluded, after identifying as many hidden costs
as possible, that the private prisons were operated more cost effectively than were
the public facilities. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 70-93.
Both supporters and opponents of privatization are awaiting the results of an
experiment currently underway in Louisiana. That state has constructed three
identical correctional· centers, one of which will be managed by CCA, one by
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, and the third by the state. AMMONS ET AL., supra
note 19, at 34. Because of the similarities among the three facilities, comparative
analysis of the costs and quality of care afforded by them should provide more
accurate data regarding the costs of privatization than do surveys comparing facilities
with many distinguishing characteristics.
64.
LoGAN, supra note 3, at 45-48.
65. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 51.
66.
Ira P. Robbins, The Impact ofthe Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization,
35 UCLA L. REV. 911, 952 (1988).
67. See, e.g., id. at 912 & n.2.
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margins by reducing the quantity or quality of services provided to prisoners. 68 When faced with the need to improve the
bottom line, private entrepreneurs might reduce staff or stint
on personnel training to the detriment of prisoners. 69 Unless
the government implements some form of monitoring system,
it will be unable to discover or deter these types of unsavory
practices. 70
A related concern involves what Martin Sellers has termed
the "feather their nest" syndrome. 71 Private contractors need
many convicts to maintain profitability and to expand prison
operations. 72 To preserve their inmate populations, these
entrepreneurs could resort to unethical or unjust policies to
prolong prison sentences and keep prisoners from being released on probation. 73 Even if the state discovers such unscrupulous contractors, critics still fear that private prison
companies will buy off public officials with bribes, payoffs, and
kickbacks. 74
Compounding these risks of opportunism among private
contractors and increasing the difficulties associated with
accountability is the nature of the prison setting itself. Although taxpayers pay for correctional services, most taxpayers
do not sample the wares, whether furnished by the state or a

68. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 52.
69.
Keating, supra note 3, at 131. According to this view, privatization achieves
most of its touted financial economies by reducing labor costs-a form of union busting
that results in fewer and less professional prison workers. Craig Becker, With Whose
Hands: Privatization, Public Employment, and Democracy, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
88, 91 (1988). Not surprisingly, the presidents of the American Federation of
Government Employees and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees both oppose prison privatization. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 5·9.
70.
Robbins, supra note 2, at 724-25.
71. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 51.
72. Most contracts for prison management provide contractors with a per diem
rate for each inmate incarcerated in the facility. Herman B. Leonard, Private Time:
The Political Economy ofPrivate Prison Finance, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC
INTEREST, supra note 2, at 66, 79.
73.
SELLERS, supra note 5, at 58. As described by Professor Logan:
Will the cost-calculating warden revoke a prisoner's good time to gain a little
"extra" per diem revenue? Or will he bribe inmates with liberal grants of good
time credit in order to buy their cooperation and to avoid the expense of the
extra paperwork required by disciplinary proceedings? Or will he decide that it
is least costly in the long run to govern firmly but fairly and consistently?
LoGAN,

74.

supra note 3, at 69.
SELLERS, supra note 5, at 59.
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private entity. 75 Only prisoners are in a position to judge the
quality and sufficiency of the services provided, and prisoners
are neither the most visible nor the most articulate group in
society. 76 This "hidden delivery"77 problem is exacerbated by the
fact that average citizens care little about the plight of convicts
and are unlikely to exert pressure to ensure that prisoners
receive quality care. 78
While not discounting the need for accountability, Professor
Charles Logan, a supporter of privatized corrections, argues
that both public and private prisons should be subject to the
same standards and supervision. 79 By contracting out for correctional services, the state does not deny ultimate responsibility for production of those services. Instead, the state
merely chooses to administer its responsibility through private,
rather than public, employees. 80 Both government workers and
private contractors may act dishonestly or unethically, and
both public and private prisons are secluded from the community. 81 Accordingly, prisons should be monitored and ultimately
subjected to disclosure whether they are run by the state or the
private sector. 82 Professor Logan concedes, however, that both
private contractors and the government may try to escape
responsibility for abuses by blaming each other. 83
Some proponents of privatization go one step further, asserting that private contractors already may be more accountable legally, economically, politically, and socially. 84 According
to this argument, private prison companies are subject to

75.
Becker, supra note 69, at 105.
76. Id.
77. James T. Gentry, Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem ofMonitoring
Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353, 356 (1986) (defining "hidden delivery" as a market
failure occurring when a purchaser of goods or services does not observe consumption
and thus "cannot accurately gauge the quantity and quality of the product").
78.
Diiulio, supra note 27, at 164.
79.
LoGAN, supra note 3, at 210.
80. See id. at 50-52.
81. See id. at 55-57, 194.
82. Id. at 204.
83. Id. at 194-95; see, e.g., Martin Tolchin, Jails Run by Private Company Force
it to Face Question ofAccountability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1985, atA15. In that article,
Tolchin quotes the Reverand Roberto Flores of the Houston Center for Immigration
as saying: "[W]henever we have a problem, [the) I.N.S. tells us to go to [the private
contractor), and [the private contractor) tells us to go to [the) l.N.S." Id.
84.
LoGAN, supra note 3, at 195-202; see also AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at
14-15 ("Not only are private sector operators monitored by the courts and government
agencies, they also are scrutinized by the media, civil rights groups, and prison reform
activists.").
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marketplace checks that do not exist in the public sector. 85 The
relative novelty and controversial nature of private prisons has
drawn media attention, increasing the overall visibility of
corrections in the public eye. 86 Additionally, most government
contracts for prison operations mandate some type of government supervision, such as the use of on-site, state-employed
monitors. 87 Although Professor Logan agrees that prison
contracts should include provisions requiring some sort of
monitoring system,88 he decries proposals such as that of Professor Ira Robbins 89 for imposing "double standards" on private and
public prisons in the name of accountability. 90 Professor Logan
finds it unfair to saddle private prison operators with expensive
monitoring requirements "far beyond those that exist for government prisons."91
.
Privatization of corrections presents a host of legal issues,
including questions regarding the government's authority to
delegate its penal function to private entities. 92 Critics of
private prisons have found constitutional obstacles to such
delegations because the power to incarcerate implicates the
due process rights of prisoners. 93 Supporters of privatization,
however, argue that the government achieves its penological
objectives through private corporations legitimately and con85. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 14. Marketplace checks include economic
competition for lucrative prison contracts, the threat of contract termination or
nonrenewal for poor performance, and independent assessments of risk or mismanagement by investment counselors, shareholders, and liability insurers. LoGAN, supra
note 3, at 197.
86. LOGAN, supra note 3, at 202-03.
87. Id. at 206.
88. Id. at 65. Logan suggests that these monitors should review contractors'
"discretionary decisions" regarding complaints of unfair treatment filed by inmates.
Id.
89. In 1988, the American Bar Association issued a report prepared by Professor
Robbins that recommended model legislation and a model contract to guide jurisdictions desiring prison privatization. See generally Robbins, supra note 2, at 612-794
(providing model contract and statute provisions and detailed commentary regarding
prison privatization, from financial and physical plant issues to questions of inmate
management, use of force, indemnification, and government monitoring).
90.
LOGAN, supra note 3, at 146-47.
91. Id. at 147.
92. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 66, at 950 (concluding that courts may find
government delegations of prison management unconstitutional when disciplinary
rules are formulated by private parties); cf. Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics,
Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 502 n.250 (1988) (predicting that courts will
not be persuaded that delegation of prison management to private parties is unconstitutional absent specific allegations of abuse).
93. See, e.g., Field, supra note 63, at 673-74 (arguing that as a matter of fairness
and equity, only the government should "limit people's freedom").
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stitutionally so long as it retains ultimate authority over the
delegation. 94 Although no court has addressed this issue
directly, some commentators find Medina v. O'Neill 95 significant.96 In this case, a federal court had an opportunity to find
private incarceration unconstitutional and did not do so. 97
To resolve the delegation question at the state level, many
state legislatures have passed laws authorizing private incarceration. 98 Less clear, however, is whether the federal government needs or already has similar statutory authority. No
comprehensive federal enabling legislation exists as such. By
not adopting such legislation, Congress has overlooked an
important opportunity to impose accountability standards on
federal correctional agencies.
While no comprehensive federal statute exists, some observers believe privatization of federal incarceration is provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). 99 Norman Carlson, the former
Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, argues that this
section gives the federal government the authority to privatize
its prisons. 100 Section 3621(b) provides that the Bureau of
94. E.g., LOGAN, supra note 3, at 60; Ellison, supra note 16, at 693.
95. 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), uacated in part, reu'd in part on other
grounds, 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988). In Medina, a federal district court found that
the INS was liable under a "state action" theory for the behavior of a private party
hired by the INS to detain Colombian stowaways. 589 F. Supp. at 1038. For an
analysis of the state action doctrine in the private prison context, see Robbins, supra
note 2, at 577-604.
Questions concerning the availability of qualified iinmunity to private prison
personnel for violations of prisoners' civil rights are discussed at length in Charles
W. Thomas, Resoluing the Problem of Qualified Immunity for Priuate Defendants in
Section 1983 and Bivens Damage Suits, 53 LA. L. REV. 449 (1992).
96. See Douglas C. McDonald, When Gouernment Fails: Going Private as a Last
Resort, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST, supra note 2, at 179, 181
(commenting on judges foregoing the opportunity to address the constitutionality of
prison privatization). But cf. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 55 (construing Medina as
granting the INS a constitutional right to contract with private parties to detain
excludable aliens). ·
97. Medina, 589 F. Supp. at 1038.
98. E.g., TEX. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 495.001 (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing the
Texas Board of Corrections to "contract with a private vendor ... for the financing,
construction, operation, maintenance, or management of a secure correctional
facility"). For a partial list of state enabling statutes, see Robbins, supra note 2, at
768-71.
99.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b)
(1982)).
100. Norman A. Carlson, Prison Priuatization, 17 CORRECTIONS DIG. 3 (1986).
Carlson discusses 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1982), which was the precursor of§ 3621(b).
The operative language has not changed. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1982) with
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The current statute states:
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Prisons may designate as a place of confinement any appropriate facility "whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise." 101 Under Carlson's view, this language
acknowledges the federal government's power to delegate
prison maintenance to private entities. 102 At least one
commentor maintains, however, that Congress intended the
"or otherwise" clause merely to permit federal offenders to be
placed in state facilities. 103 After examining the legislative
history, purpose, and context of the statute, Professor Robbins
concludes that the statute allows the Bureau of Prisons to
contract with private entities only for the operation of prerelease residential community treatment centers. 104 According
to this view, the federal government lacks the necessary
statutory authority to privatize other types of incarceration
facilities. 105
Uncertainty surrounding the legal implications of prison
privatization led the American Bar Association in 1986 to
adopt a resolution advising jurisdictions not to contract with
the private sector for prison management services "until the
complex constitutional, statutory, and contractual issues are
developed and resolved." 106 Despite these complicated issues,
however, prison privatization continues to gain momentum on
both the federal and state level. 107
Continued growth in prison privatization can hardly be
surprising, considering that the factors that prompted public
officials to privatize during the 1980s have become more

The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment.
The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that
meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau,
whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether
within or without the judicial district in which the person was convicted ....

Id. § 3621(b) (emphasis added) The only difference between the current provision and
§ 4082(b) is that the earlier provision requires the Attorney General, not the Bureau
of Prisons, to designate the place of confinement. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1982).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (emphasis added).
102. Carlson, supra note 100, at 1-5.
103. Field, supra note 63, at 667-68.
104. Robbins, supra note 2, at 767.
105. Id.
106. SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Report lllB at 1 (1986).
.
107. Prison privatization has been called a "nationwide trend" by some members
of the press. E.g., Linda Kleindienst, Florida Adds Privatized Prisons, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 1994, at Cl.
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pressing. Prison populations, once expected to ease in this
decade, have swelled. 108 Public sentiment continues to favor
longer sentences for criminals and disapprove of early release
programs. 109 Current prison facilities continue to age and
become outdated, necessitating new construction. 110 Although
leaders may have abandoned Reagan era privatization, they
continue to endorse the concept, while calling for "less government management and more government leadership." 111
Private corrections firms see a lucrative opportunity in these
attitudes and statistics. 112 The Bureau of Prisons maintains
that it has· the necessary authority to contract with private
firms for correctional services. 113 Recently, the U.S. Marshals
Service has followed the Bureau of Prison's lead; in 1990, it
contracted with CCA to manage a maximum-security detention
center in Leavenworth, Kansas. 114 CCA began operating the
256-bed institution in June 1992. 115
As private correctional facilities proliferate, we must remember past abuse. Inevitably, the legal questions of unauthorized delegation, statutory authority, and due process
surrounding prison privatization circle back to the problem of
accountability. Only safeguards in the form of government
standards and supervision will ensure ultimate control of

108. McDonald, supra note 45, at 8. The number of felons housed in federal
prisons has grown from 24,500 in 1980 to 76,000 in 1993. By 1993, private facilities
held an additional 8200 convicts.· Penny Bender, Crowded Prisons Blamed on
Sentencing Guidelines, Gannett News Service, May 12, 1993, at *2, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Mags File. The Bureau of Prisons has estimated that by 1999
the federal system will accommodate 116,000 people. Id. The average number of
prisoners handled daily by the U.S. Marshals Service has multiplied from 5383 in
1984 to 20,084 in 1993. Vath, supra note 5, at 33.
109. LoGAN, supra note 3, at 236; see also Vath, supra note 5, at 320 ("As citizens
. repeatedly call for locking up more criminals and returning the streets to law-abiding
people, ... [p)olitical leaders are feeling the heat about early release programs that
are intended to ease prison overcrowding.").
110. See McDonald, supra note 45, at 5-6 (reporting that only 21 % of federal
prisons satisfy the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections standards). Although
Congress has approved funding for 50,000 additional prison beds, this figure hardly
accommodates demand. Bender, supra note 108, at *2.
111. Paul R. Verkuil, Reverse Yardstick Competition: A New Deal for the Nineties,
45 FLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993).
112. See, e.g., CCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 4 ("We intend to pursue
every opportunity that makes economic sense.").
113. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 35 n.11.
114. Id. at 19; Vath, supra note 5, at 320.
115. CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AMERICA, FACILITY PROFILES 6 (1994) [hereinafter
CCA FACILITY PROFILES) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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privatized facilities and protection ofinmates' liberty interests.
Commentators note that adequate monitoring of private
prisons will resolve much of the doubt concerning their propriety .116 Even Professor Robbins admits that private prisons may
be constitutional "if the government properly oversees, reviews, and circumscribes the private company's authority." 117
Many monitoring systems have been proposed to ensure that
private prisons are as accountable to the public as are publicly
operated prisons. 118 Accountability cannot be achieved, however, without clear standards. In the federal context, where no
enabling legislation specifically authorizes private prisons to
create performance criteria, 119 correctional agencies are free to
create performance criteria for private operators.
Without predictable legislative standards, the public has
been effectively shut out of the privatization process. Without
public awareness, public input regarding the operation of
private prisons is inadequate. But does the public have equal
access to information concerning public and private federal
prisons? To answer that question, it is necessary to consider
how the FOIA applies to public prisons and to determine
whether it is relevant to privatized facilities.
II. FEDERAL PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE FOIA
Congress passed the FOIA120 in 1966121 as a bipartisan effort
to open the workings of government to the public. 122 As the
many administrative agencies created during this century took
over large areas of government responsibility, 123 it became
116. See, e.g., Gentry, supra note 77, at 358-59.
117. Robbins, supra note 66, at 915.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 394-99.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105.
120. Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
121. Although the FOIA was signed into law on July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487,
80 Stat. 250 (1966), the legislation did not take effect until one year later. Pub. L. No.
90-23, § 4, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) (amending the FOIA) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1988)).
122. KENT R. MIDDLETON & BILL F. CHAMBERLIN, THE LAW OF PuBLIC COMMUNICATIONS 455 (3d ed. 1994).
123. See HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNow: LEGAL ACCESS TO
PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS 223 (1953) ("Nearly every phase of our lives and
business is affected in some way, directly or indirectly, visibly or invisibly, to a greater
or lesser degree by a maze of federal administrative regulations.").
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more difficult for citizens to find out "what their government
[was] up to." 124 Although the public records section of the
Administrative Procedure Act 125 (APA) was intended to make
government records accessible, a 1953 study by Professor
Harold Cross concluded that the government has used that
provision's vague wording as authority for withholding records
from the press. 126
Congress amended the APA with the FOIA to remedy this
problem; the FOIA established a policy of "disclosure, not
secrecy" 127 with respect to federal agency records. When signing the FOIA into law, President Lyndon Johnson emphasized
the importance of an accessible government:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential
principles: a democracy works best when the people have
all the information that the security of the Nation permits.
No one should be able to pull the curtains of secrecy
around decisions which can be revealed without injury to
the public interest. 128
Government accountability to the public, then, lies at the
heart of the FOIA. The Act's legislative history makes clear
that Congress had at least two goals in mind when envisioning
the FOIA: first, to provide the electorate with the necessary
information to make informed choices about public policy; 129
124. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (quoting Henry
Steele Commanger, The Defeat of America, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 5, 1972, at 7).
125. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (codified at 5
u.s.c. § 552 (1988)).
126. See CROSS, supra note 123, at 227-28. For examples of government agencies
that used the APA to withhold information from the public, see H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2422.
127. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
128. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Revising Public Information
Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, July 4, 1966, 2 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 895 (July 11, 1966).
129. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966), reprinted in
1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429:
A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the
intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information
varies. A danger signal to our democratic society in the United States is the fact
that such a political truism needs repeating. And repeated it is, in textbooks and
classrooms, in newspapers and broadcasts.
The repetition is necessary because the ideals of our democratic society have
outpaced the machinery which makes that society work. The needs of the electorate
have outpaced the laws which guarantee public access to the facts in Government.
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and second, "to protect the American public from the evils of
secret government." 130 Permeating both goals is the beliefthat
public scrutiny of government activity will promote bureaucratic accountability. 131 Recognizing the value of public access
to federal agency records, Justice Powell opined that the
FOIA's purpose is "to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, ... to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed. "132
The FOIA seeks to preserve government accountability by
requiring federal agencies 133 to provide three types of information to the public. First, agencies must publish in the
Federal Register basic data, such as descriptions of agency
organization, explanations of FOIA procedures, and lists of
persons to contact with FOIA requests. 134 Second, agencies
must allow the public to inspect and copy "'reading room'
materials, "135 such as final opinions in adjudicated cases, specific policy statements, and certain administrative staffmanuals.136 Third, and most importantly, agencies must make
available to "any person" all other records that are properly
requested, reasonably described, and not otherwise exempt
from disclosure. 137
Upon receipt of a formal FOIA request, an agency can either
disclose the relevant records or justify nondisclosure with one
of nine statutory exemptions. 138 Because the FOIA's purpose
Id. For a detailed analysis and history of the FOIA, see Kenneth C. Davis, The
Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967); Jim Smith,
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966: A Legislative History Analysis, 74 LAW
LmR. J. 231 (1981).
130. 112 CONG. REC. 13,660 (1966) (statement of Rep. Matsunaga).
131. See supra notes 129-30.
132. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (citations
omitted).
133. For the meaning of "federal agency," see infra Part 11.A.1.
134. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l) (1988).
135. OFFICE OF INFORMATION & PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 5 (Pamela Maida ed., Sept. 1994)
[hereinafter FOIA OVERVIEW].
136. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1988).
137. Id. § 552(a)(3). The agency's disclosure determination must be made without
regard to the requester's identity or intended use of the information. See NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975) ("[R]ights under the Act are
neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [the requester] claims an
interest ... greater than that shared by the average member of the public.").
138. These exemptions allow agencies to withhold records that pertain to national
security, internal agency rules, matters exempted from disclosure by other federal
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is to "open agency action to the light of public scrutiny," 139 the
Supreme Court has recognized that FOIA exemptions must be
"narrowly construed." 140 Even records that fall within one of
these exemptions may be disclosed at the agency's discretion,
unless such disclosure is prohibited by other law. 141
With respect to federal prisons, the FOIA clearly applies to
cabinet offices such as the Department of Justice and to the
agencies that report to it, including the Bureau of Prisons, the
INS, and the U.S. Marshals Service. 142 The last three agencies
are considered "components" of the Department of Justice, 143
and as such are governed by the Department's FOIA guidelines.144 Each of these agencies has been involved in FOIA
litigation. 145
This Article considers whether the FOIA applies to federal
prison records once those prisons are under private management. Two inquiries are involved in deciding whether these
records will be subject to the FOIA. First, it must be determined whether a private organization operating a federal
prison is a federal "agency" under the FOIA. If the private
entity is not considered a federal agency under the FOIA, the

statutes, trade secrets and confidential commercial information, inter- or intra-agency
. memoranda, personnel and medical files, law enforcement information, matters
concerning the operation of financial institutions, and geological information.
5 u.s.c. § 552(b)OH9) (1988).
139. Rose, 425 U.S. at 372 (citation omitted).
140. United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (citations
omitted).
141. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1979) (holding that FOIA
exemptions permit, but do not require, a federal agency to withhold records). For an
example of a statute that prohibits disclosure, see the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905 (Supp. V 1993), which forbids agency personnel from disclosing certain kinds
of confidential information.
142. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (defining "agency" to include "any executive department ...
or other establishment in the executive branch").
143. 28 C.F.R. § 16.l(b)(3), app. I (1994).
144. 28 C.F.R. § 16 (1994). The INS has published additional FOIA guidelines.
8 C.F.R. § 103.8 (1994).
145. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989)
(stating that the FOIA requires the Department of Justice to disclose district court
decisions it receives in the course of litigating tax cases); Powell v. United States
Bureau of Prisons, 927 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (remanding for further consideration a prisoner's FOIA request for disclosure of the "Central Inmate Monitoring
Manuar>; Lawyer's Comm. for Human Rights v. INS, 721 F. Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (noting that the court would review documents in camera to decide whether the
INS was justified in claiming FOIA exemptions); Heller v. United States Marshals
Serv., 655 F. Supp. 1088 (D.D.C. 1987) (ruling that documents sought from the U.S.
Marshals Service were exempt under the FOIA).
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question becomes whether the records of that organization
nevertheless could be considered "agency records."

A. Does a Private Organization Operating a Federal Prison
Constitute a Federal "Agency" for the Purposes of the FOIA?
1. Defining a FOIA Agency-By its terms, the FOIA only
applies to federal "agencies." 146 Because the FOIA originally
did not define "agency," 147 courts were left to apply the APA's
definition to FOIA actions. 148 Under the APA, "agency" means
"each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another
agency," not including Congress or the courts. 149
In interpreting the APA's definition of agency, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Soucie v.
David 150 premised agency status upon an entity's power to act
independently in a specific area. 151 In that case, the court found
that the Office of Science and Technology (OST), a congressionally established unit within the Executive Office of the President, constitUted a federal agency because it independently
evaluated federal programs. 152 According to the court, "the APA
apparently confers agency status on any administrative unit
with substantial independent authority in the exercise of
specific functions. "153
Four years later, in Washington Research Project, Inc. v.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 154 the District
of Columbia Circuit narrowed the Soucie test to one of inde146. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1988).
147. Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (amending the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)). The FOIA was
enacted as an amendment to the APA. Id.
148. See, e.g., Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ.
& Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing the APA's definition of
agency), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1072-76
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the Office of Science and Technology (OST) is an agency
under the APA and not merely staff to the President).
149. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1988). Congress and the courts are expressly excluded from
the APA definition of agency. Id. § 551(1)(A)-(B).
150. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
151. Id. at 1073.
152. Id. at 1075. The court was also influenced by the fact that the OST published
FOIA guidelines in the Federal Register. Id.
153. Id. at 1073.
154. 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
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pendent decision-making authority. 155 The court held that
initial review groups (IRGs) comprised of nongovernmental
consultants hired by the National Institute of Mental Health
were advisory committees performing staff functions and not
agencies under the FOIA. 156 The institute used the IRGs to
evaluate grant applications for scientific research projects, and
usually followed the IRGs' recommendations with only perfunctory review. 157 .Despite the pivotal advisory role played by
the IRGs in the decision-making process, the court determined
that the IRGs had not become the "functional equivalent" of
the government institute because they were not "making its
decisions for it." 158 The decisive factor identified by the court
in resolving whether an entity is an agency subject to the
FOIA was "whether [the entity] has any authority in law to
make decisions." 159
In 1974, Congress amended the FOIA to add the following
language to the APA definition of "agency":
For purposes of this section, the term 'agency' ... includes
any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or
other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or
any independent regulatory agency. 160
According to the Committee on Government Operations's report on the proposed amendment to the FOIA, the definition
was enlarged to include entities "which perform governmental
functions and control .information of interest to the public." 161
The Committee's report further explains that the definition
was not intended to include "corporations which receive appro-

155. 504 F.2d at 248.
156. Id. at 246.
157. Id. at 248.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 248 (emphasis added). One commentator notes that the Washington
Research court in effect ruled that an entity cannot become the equivalent of an agency
unless that entity has statutory authority to make decisions for the agency. See Anne H.
Wright, Note, The Definition of"Agency" Under the Freedom ofInformation Act as Applied
to Federal Consultants and Grantees, 69 GEO. L.J. 1223, 1240 (1981).
160. Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 3(e),
88 Stat. 1561, 1564 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(0 (1988)).
161. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6274.
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priated funds .but are neither chartered by the Federal Government nor controlled by it." 162
Despite the "governmental function" language in the definition's legislative history, 163 litigation addressing when private
organizations become agencies for FOIA purposes has focused
not. on the function performed by the organization, but rather
on the extent of government control over the entity. In Fors ham
v. Harris, 164 the leading case, the Supreme Court held that a
private organization will constitute a federal agency subject to
the FOIA only ifit is subject to extensive, day-to-day control by
the government. 165
In Forsham, the Court held that a privately operated organization receiving federal grants to perform medical research was
not a federal agency and, therefore, its research data were not
accessible under the FOIA. 166 The research, which resulted in
proceedings by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to restrict
the labeling and use of certain drugs in diabetes treatment, was
funded solely through grants awarded by the National Institute
of Arthritis, Metabolism, and Digestive Diseases (NIAMDD), a
subdivision ofHEW. 167 Patient records and raw data generated
by the grantee remained in the private organization's possession.168 The NIAMDD, however, retained the right to access
these records under the grant agreement, though it did not

162. S. CONF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6293.
163. For a discussion of the legislative history behind the FOIA definition of
"agency," see Irwin Memorial Blood Bank of the San Francisco Medical Soc'y v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1052-54 (9th Cir. 1981).
164. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
165. Id. at 180 & n.11.
166. Id. at 171. Because the Forsham appellants did not raise the question of
whether the grantee was an agency, but rather argued that the data gathered by the
grantee were "agency records," it has been suggested that the Court's discussion of
what constitutes an agency for FOIA purposes is dicta. Wright, supra note 159, at
1235 n. 78. However, this analysis overlooks the Court's reasoning that agency records
are usually created by federal agencies. Although the Court admitted that records of
a nonagency could become agency records, 445 U.S. at 181, it concluded that in this
instance, "Congress excluded private grantees from FOIA disclosure obligations by
excluding them from the definition of 'agency'." Id. at 179. Therefore, the Court's
determination that this grantee did not qualify as a federal agency was instrumental
to its holding that the data were not agency records.
167. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 171-72.
168. Id. at 173.
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exercise this right. 169 The government could even request
permanent custody of the data but chose not to do so. 170
The Court noted that although the NIAMDD supervised the
research by conducting on-site visits and requiring periodic
reports, the "day-to-day administration of grant-supported
activities" remained in the discretion of the grantee. 171 Notwithstanding that the study was financed entirely with federal
funds and monitored by the NIAMDD to ensure compliance
with the grant requirements, the Court determined that "[t]he
funding and supervision indicated by the facts of this case are
consistent with the usual grantor-grantee relationship and do
not suggest the requisite magnitude of Government control." 172
In reaching its decision, the Court looked to the meaning of
"federal agency" in a non-FOIA context, specifically the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 173 Additionally, the Court referred to its decision in United States v. Orleans 174 in support
of the proposition that a grantee must be subject to day-to-day
supervision by the federal government to become a federal
agency. 175 In Orleans, the Court held that receipt of a federal
block grant did not make a community action organization an
agency subject to the FTCA, because the government did not
exercise day-to-day control of the grantee's activities. 176
Along with the extent of government control over a private
entity's daily operations and decision-making authority, courts
also have considered the entity's organizational structure. For
example, in Rocap u. Indiek, 177 the District of Columbia Circuit
noted several significant organizational features of the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) and concluded that
it was a "Government controlled corporation" subject to the
FOIA's requirements. 178 The court referred to the FHLMC's
federal charter, its presidentially appointed board of directors,
and its staff, who are considered employees of the United States
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 180 n.11.
173. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 843 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Under the FTCA, the federal government is liable for
torts committed by its employees acting within the scope of their employment. 28
u.s.c. § 1346(b) (1988).
174. 425 U.S. 807 (1976).
175. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 180 n.11.
176. Orleans, 425 U.S. at 815.
177. 539 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
178. Id. at 180-81.
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for certain purposes, as "indicia of federal involvement and
control which courts have generally relied upon in determining
whether an entity is a federal agency." 179 These indicia of
control, combined with the government's close supervision of
the FHLMC's business transactions, outweighed other factors
that argued against agency status, such as the FHLMC's lack
of federally appropriated funds. 180
Finally, in a case analogous to private prison operators,
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, 181 the District of Columbia Circuit held
that medical peer-review committees are not agencies under the
FOIA. 182 In that case, a non-profit corporation comprised of
private physicians contracted with HEW to review the necessity
and quality of medical services reimbursed through the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 183 These peer review committees
were required by contract to comply with operational standards
imposed by statute and HEW's program manual. 184 The trial
court termed these restrictions as "pervasive procedural requirements."185 The appellate court disagreed, however, holding
that these controls did not constitute the day-to-day supervision
requisite for agency status under Forsham. 186 Instead, the court
reasoned that these requirements were necessary only to ensure
that government funds had been spent properly and that the
committees had complied with their HEW contracts. 187 The
court held that by merely providing HEW with their expertise
under contract, the committee members did not become either
government employees or part of a government agency. 188
In summary, courts have considered four factors to determine when a private organization should be treated as an
agency under the FOIA. First, and most importantly, a private
entity becomes an agency when its operations are subject to

179. Id. at 180; cf. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank of the San Francisco Medical Soc'y
v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1056-58 (9th Cir. 1981) (ruling that the
Red Cross is not an agency for FOIA purposes despite its federal charter and
presidentially appointed board, because its staff are not United States employees and
its operations are not subject to substantial federal control).
180. Rocap, 539 F.2d at 176, 180.
181. 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
182. Id. at 544.
183. Id. at 538-39, 543.
184. Id. at 541.
185. Id. at 544.
186. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 164-76.
187. Public Citizen, 668 F.2d at 544.
188. Id. at 543-44.
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extensive, detailed, and daily control by the federal government. 189 Second, the courts may be guided by analogy to the
definition of agency under the FTCA. 190 Third, a private entity
is more likely to be an agency if it exhibits certain organizational characteristics of federal agencies, such as holding a
federal charter or having a presidentially appointed board of
directors. 191 Finally, several earlier cases suggest that a private entity with independent authority to make legally binding
decisions on behalf of an agency could be considered ·an
agency. 192
2. Applying the FOIA Definition of Agency to Private Prison
Operators
a. The Control Test-A private entity managing a federal
prison will be considered an agency under the FOIA only if it
is subject to extensive government control of its daily operations.193 The contract between the firm and the government
may indicate a high degree of control because the prison
management firm must comply with whatever standards and
supervision that the contract requires. 194 Generally, the contracting agency solicits bids for a particular project through a
request for proposals (RFP) that sets out the agency's specifications for the project and conditions for employment. 195
Although many RFPs from the early 1980s contained only
general requirements, 196 RFPs issued by the INS and the
Bureau of Prisons have in the past been quite specific. 197 INS
contracts generally require on-site monitoring by INS offi-

189. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 180 & n.11 (1980).
190. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813-15 (1975). For a discussion of the
definition offederal agency under the FI'CA, see infra text accompanying notes 215-25.
191. See, e.g., Rocap v. lndiek, 539 F.2d 174, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
192. See, e.g., Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ.
& Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 164-76.
194. As one CCA employee told me, "The contract rules all." Telephone Interview
with Ramsey Wall, Administrative Assistant, Corrections Corporation of America
(July 5, 1994); see also Keating, supra note 3, at 140 ("The contract incorporates the
norms of conduct to which a private contractor will be held.").
195. Robbins, supra note 2, at 613-14.
196. JUDITH HACKETT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ISSUES IN CONTRACTING FOR
THE PRIVATE OPERATION OF PRISONS AND JAILS 43 (1987).
197. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 2, at 613 n.427 (referring to an INS RFP that
was 98 pages long and a Bureau of Prisons RFP that was 177 pages long). In the
current INS contracting system, for example, the winning proposal may be "about the
size of a Sears, Roebuck Christmas catalog" if it entails both building and operating
a facility. Diiulio, supra note 27, at 162.
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cials, 198 who carry a copy of the contract as they walk around
the private facilities, observing contract compliance. 199
If the contract spells out detailed performance standards
and subjects the contractor to continuous monitoring, it could
be argued that the federal government is exercising extensive
day-to-day control over the contractor's procedures. On the
other hand, despite providing detailed contract procedures, the
government may not wield authority over daily prison operations. Private sector managers are hired to manage prisons;
they, not the government, control the day-to-day rules of
prison life. 200
The proper role for private sector managers in enforcing
prison discipline has been a topic of debate. The practice
differs from prison to prison. At least one Bureau of Prisons
RFP allows staff members of a private halfway house to serve
on the facility's disciplinary committee. 201 And, in 1985, CCA
employees handled disciplinary cases at the Houston INS
detention center. 202 The degree of the CCA administrator's
authority was made clear when he told a reporter: "I review
every disciplinary action .... I'm the Supreme Court."203
Although Professor Robbins recommends that all disciplinary
cases in private prisons be determined only by government
officials, 204 others urge that initial disciplinary and classification decisions be left to the private managers, subject only to
government review. 205 But even if private prison employees
could act only as witnesses in government-conducted disciplinary hearings, the government could not completely eliminate private operators' discretion to lodge a complaint, ignore
an incident, or settle some disciplinary matters on their
own.2os
In ascertaining whether the federal government exerts daily
operational control over private correctional facilities sufficient to render such organizations federal agencies under the
FOIA, the District of Columbia Circuit's analysis in Public

198. See Diiulio, supra note 27, at 162.
199. E.g., LoGAN, supra note 3, at 23; Diiulio, supra note 27, at 162.
200. Field, supra note 63, at 661 (citing Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880,
884 (W.D.N.Y. 1972)).
201. Robbins, supra note 2, at 713 n.847.
202. Tolchin, supra note 83, at A15.
203. Id.
204. Robbins, supra note 2, at 712-13.
205. E.g., LoGAN, supra note 3, at 70.
206. Press, supra note 31, at 35.
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Citizen Health Research Group v. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 207 is particularly helpful. Like private prison
managers, the medical peer-review committees in Public Citizen
had to comply with detailed government contracts. 208 According
to the court, however, the existence of these contracts meant
not that the federal government controlled the committees'
activities but rather that the contracts established only the
terms of employment between private experts and the government and a method of monitoring how governmental funds were
spent. 209 Similarly, in Forsham v. Harr.is, 210 the grant agreement between the private grantee and the federal agency was
characterized by the Supreme Court as "just the exercise of
regulatory authority," 211 rather than "substantial federal supervision. "212
These judicial interpretations of the "control" test.lead to the
conclusion that courts are unlikely to find private prison operators sufficiently subject to government regulation of their
daily affairs to be considered federal agencies under the FOIA.
Even when prison managers tailor their performance to detailed government contracts, the courts will most probably
portray these contracts as government regulated, not as
indicia of an agency relationship. And, according to Forsham,
this result would not change even if the government retained
a right of access to prison records or had contractual authority
to take possession of the records but chose not to exercise it. 213
b. The Federal Torts Claim Act-Private prison operators
also will not constitute federal agencies pursuant to the
FTCA's definition of "[f]ederal agency," 214 considering the Supreme Court's application of that definition. The FTCA's
definition of federal agency excludes government contractors215
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 544; see supra text accompanying note 184.
Public Citizen, 668 F.2d at 544.
445 U.S. 169 (1980).
Id. at 180 n.11.
Id.
Id. at 182-86; see supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
28 u.s.c. § 2671 (1988).
Id. The statute provides:

As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the term
"Federal agency" includes the executive departments, the judicial and legislative
branches, the military departments, independent establishments of the United
States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the
United States, but does not include any contractor with the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988) (emphasis added).
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and the Court has strictly construed this exclusion. 216 In Logue
u. United States, 217 a Texas county had contracted with the
federal government to incarcerate federal prisoners. 218 The
contract provided that the county would house prisoners in
compliance with the Bureau, of Prisons's rules and regulations
governing visitation rights, mail, medical services, employment, communications with attorneys, and methods of discipline. 219 After a federal prisoner housed in the county jail
committed suicide, the federal government was sued under the
FTCA for negligence. 220 The court focused on whether the
county jail was a federal agency under the FTCA and thus,
whether its staff would be considered "employee[s] of the
Government" under the FTCA. 221
Under the contract with the county jail, the federal government determined the conditions under which its prisoners
were incarcerated and retained the right to access the facility
to supervise these conditions. 222 Nevertheless, the Court held
that the day-to-day operations of the jail remained the responsibility of the county, rather than that of the Bureau of
Prisons. 223 According to the Court, the federal government's
role was "limited to the payment of sufficiently high rates to
induce the contractor to do a good job. "224 Because the federal
government lacked the authority to physically supervise the
jail's employees, the county was found to be a contractor under
the statute, and therefore not a federal agency within the
meaning of the FTCA. 225
Although Logue involved a county jail under the FTCA, the
case's implications to private prison management are revealing because the Supreme Court has continued to analogize the
definition of agency under the FOIA to the definition in the
FTCA. 226 First, the Court's holding that the contract in Logue
did not grant the federal government sufficient control over

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See, e.g., Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 527-28 (1973).
412 U.S. 521 (1973).
Id. at 525.
Id. at 529-30.
Id. at 522, 525.
Id. at 526 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2671).
Id. at 529-30.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
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the jail to make the county an agency under the FTCA suggests that contractual standards governing the operation of
private prisons are unlikely to satisfy the FOIA's "control"
test. 227 Second, the FTCA's definition of agency specifically
excludes federal contractors, whether public or private. 228 As
long as the Court continues to interpret the FOIA's definition
of agency as interchangeable with the FTCA's definition, 229 it
is hard to imagine that the Court will consider a private
contractor to be a federal agency under the FOIA when the
Logue court held that a municipal government entity was not
a federal agency under the FTCA.
c. Organizational Structure-The third factor courts have
used to ascertain whether a private entity is controlled by the
federal government to the extent that it qualifies as a federal
agency under the FOIA is the entity's organizational structure. 230 Because most prison management firms exhibit few of
the organizational characteristics of a federal agency, 231 private
prison operators will not satisfy this aspect of the "control" test.
Although a few private prisons are managed by nonprofit
organizations, 232 the giants in the industry are for-profit business corporations. 233 Unlike the private contractor examined in
Rocap v. Indiek, 234 prison management firms are not federally
chartered and do not have presidentially appointed boards of
directors. Unlike federal agencies, these corporations must
answer to shareholders, a more demanding constituency than
employees or the general public, and therefore freely pursue
business opportunities wherever they may lie, including the
management of both state and local facilities. 235
d. Pre-FOIA Test of Agency under the APA-Prior to the
addition of an agency definition to the FOIA in 1974, courts

227. See supra Part 11.A.2.a.
228. 28 u.s.c. § 2671 (1988).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80.
231. See LoGAN, supra note 3, at 14 (describing private prisons as closely held,
publicly traded, or employee owned).
232. See id. at 18 (describing the Eckerd Foundation, a nonprofit organization,
which operates the Eckerd Youth Development Center, in Okeechobee, Florida).
233. See AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 28 (noting that the "industry leaders"
are CCA and Wackenhut Corrections Corporations).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80.
235. For example, in 1994, CCA managed four federal prisons and three detention
centers that housed both federal and state offenders, in addition to 12 state and local
prisons, and also co-managed facilities in Australia and Great Britain. See CCA
FACILITY PROFILES, supra note 115, at 1-7.
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considered whether a private entity had the authority to make
legally binding decisions on behalf of an agency to determine
if a private entity would be subject to the FOIA. 236 Arguably,
if a private prison operator were not subject to sufficient federal control to constitute an agency under Forsham, then it had
independent authority to make its own decisions.
Even if the courts continued to apply the independent
authority test to private prison operators, only rarely would
they find that the operator maintained this kind of decisionmaking ability. While private prison operators may not be
subject to government control over daily operations, they are
still subject to contractual provisions and to agency direction
and review. 237 Certainly, prison management firms have no
statutory authority to make legally binding decisions on behalf
of federal correctional agencies. 238 In this sense, a private
prison manager is similar to a private firm hired by a federal
prison to provide laundry services. Were a prison management
firm held to exercise independent decision-making authority
on behalf of an agency, then all government contractors should
be subject to the FOIA.
Private prison operators, however, differ significantly from
private companies hired to launder inmates' uniforms-washing clothes cannot be considered an exclusively governmental
function. As a matter of policy, private prison operators perform exclusively governmental functions when they contract
with the state to manage prisons. 239 Corrections is an integral
part of the criminal justice system, involving the exercise of
government authority to deprive citizens and aliens of their
liberty and to controltheir existence behind bars. 240 In the one
reported case involving private federal detention, 241 a federal

236. See supra text accompanying notes 146-59.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 194-97.
238. See supra note 159.
239. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 69, at 93 (suggesting that the "sovereign power
of punishment" is a core public function); Field, supra note 63, at 669
("[C]onstruction and operation of a prison has traditionally been a government
responsibility and an indispensable part of the administration of the criminal law.");
Robbins, supra note 66, at 936 (arguing that incarcerating prisoners is "intrinsically
governmental in nature"). But see McDonald, supra note 45, at 183 (maintaining
that historically incarceration has not been an "intrinsically governmental function").
240. See Field, supra note 63, at 669.
241. Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), vacated in part, reu'd
in part on other grounds, 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988); see supra note 95 for a
description of the case.
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district court reasoned that the defendants' behavior constituted "state action" because the power to detain illegal aliens
falls within the "exclusive prerogative of the State. "242 Likewise, the ability to incarcerate criminals is a public function;
whether it can be delegated to the private sector is a separate
issue. 243
Although an entity's performance of a public function has
been suggested as a more appropriate test for determining
agency status under the FOIA, 244 this test is hardly ever used
by the courts. In a rare instance, a federal district court held
that the Smithsonian Institution was an agency subject to the
FOIA in part "because [the Smithsonian] performs governmental functions as a center of scholarship and national museum
responsible for the safekeeping and maintenance of national
treasures." 245 The court, however, also based its decision on
the Smithsonian's organizational structure-its federal charter, federal funding, and civil service employees. 246
According to the prevailing judicial interpretations discussed
above, private prison management firms under contract to the
federal government are unlikely to be considered agencies for
FOIA purposes even though they "perform governmental functions and control information of interest to the public."247

B. Do Records Created by a Private Prison Operator
Constitute "Agency Records" Subject to FOIA Disclosure?
1. The FOIA's Definition ofAgency Records-While private
prison operators may not be federal agencies under the FOIA
according to the courts, their records may nevertheless constitute agency records. Before materials can be obtained from an
agency under the FOIA, the desired information first must

242. 589 F. Supp. at 1038.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 92-105.
244. See Wright, supra note 159, at 1225. But cf. Edward C. Walterscheid, Access
to Federally Funded Research Data Under the Freedom ofInformation Act, 15 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 59 (1989) (warning that any test allowing federally funded
research data to be available under the FOIA would hurt U.S. economic competitiveness).
245. Cotton v. Adams, 798 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1992).
246. Id.
247. H.R. REP. No. 876, supra note 161, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6274.
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have been memorialized in the form of a record. 248 More
precisely, the FOIA only applies to "agency records," although
the FOIA never defines that term. 249 The term implies, however, the existence of some connection between the requested .
record and a federal agency. 250 In a trio of leading cases, the
Supreme Court has established that an agency must have
custody and control of records to create a sufficient nexus for
a finding of agency record status.
In Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, 251 the Court held that the FOIA requires an agency to
disclose only the documents that it has "created and retained."252 In that case, FOIA requests had been filed with the
Department of State for notes of Henry Kissinger's telephone
conversations when he was Secretary of State and Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs. 253 Before two of
the requests were filed, Kissinger had donated the material to
the Library of Congress, which is not an agency subject to the
FOIA. 254 The Court held that in refusing to honor these two
FOIA requests, the Department of State had not improperly
withheld agency records because the Department neither
possessed nor controlled the documents at the time the requests were made. 255 Furthermore, the Court held that federal
agencies have no obligation to retrieve documents that are no
longer in their custody. 256
248. For a discussion of the physical characteristics of records under the FOIA,
see Ann H. Wion, Note, The Definition of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1095-98 (1979) (noting that courts have held
that film, audio tape, and computer data are records and arguing that even materials
not designed to store information should constitute records under the FOIA if they
contain information that "a citizen might want to know").
249. The FOIA's disclosure provision applies to "records," 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988), ·
but its enforcement provision refers to "agency records," 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988).
In Forsham v. Harris, the Court stated that "[s]ince the enforcement provision of the
Act . . . refers only to 'agency records' it is certain that the disclosure obligations
imposed ... were only intended to extend to agency records." 445 U.S. 169, 178 n.8
(1980).
250. In Forsham, the Court noted that "[t]he use of the word 'agency' as a modifier
demonstrates that Congress contemplated some relationship between an 'agency' and
the 'record' requested under the FOIA." 445 U.S. at 178.
251. 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
252. Id. at 152.
253. Id. at 142-43.
254. Id. at 154-55.
255. Id. at 155.
256. Id. at 139 ("We hold today that even if a document requested under the FOIA
is wrongfully in the possession of a party not an 'agency,' the agency which received
the request does not 'improperly withhold' those materials by its refusal to institute
a retrieval action.").
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In addition, the Court stressed that mere possession of a
record by an agency is not sufficient to create an agency record
subject to the FOIA. In a third FOIA request, a columnist
sought notes of telephone conversations made by Kissinger
when he was National Security Adviser that· were kept in
Kissinger's office at the Department of State. 257 Notwithstand- .
ing the fact that this request was made after the materials
were transferred to the Library of Congress,258 the Court held
that they were not agency records subject to FOIA disclosure. 259
Kissinger made the notes as a presidential advisor. The Court
concluded that the notes, as presidential papers, were excluded
from the FOIA. 260 Although Kissinger stored the notes at the
Department of State, the Court emphasized that the Department of State neither created nor controlled them: 261 "We
simply decline to hold that the physical location of the notes of
·telephone conversations renders them 'agency records.' "262
The second case, Forsham v. Harris, 263 involved records of a
nonagency that an agency did not possess, but were arguably
subject to an agency's control. 264 In Forsham, the Court asserted that possession in addition to control was required for
materials to be agency records. 265 Forsham involved research
data generated by private grantees under a federal research
grant. 266 The grantees maintained custody of the data and
submitted only research summaries to the government. 267
Although the government retained the right to take possession
of the data, it never exercised that right. 268 HEW, the grantor
agency, refused to honor a FOIA request for the data in part
because it believed the information belonged to a private
organization. 269

257. Id. at 143-44.
258. Id. at 142.
259. Id. at 155.
260. Id. at 156 (explaining that the FOIA's legislative history reveals that the
"Executive Office" does not include the Office of the President).
261. Id. at 157.
262. Id.
263. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
264. For the information at issue in Forsham, see supra text accompanying
notes 166-72.
265. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 182.
266. Id. at 171-77.
267. Id. at 172-73.
268. Id. at 173.
269. Id. at 176.
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The Court agreed with HEW, holding that the data were not
agency records because they had been "generated" by a private
organization and had never been "obtained" by an agency. 270
Discerning a "possessory emphasis" in the Act's legislative
history, 271 the Court stated that "the FOIA applies to records
which have been in fact obtained, and not to records which
merely could have been obtained. "272 The Court reasoned that
requiring the agency to respond to the FOIA request by exercising its right of access to the data would be the same as
forcing an agency to "create" a record. 273 According to Forsham,
then, an agency must have actual physical possession of a
document for it to become an agency record. Neither an agency's right to possession nor its use of a privately created document is enough. 274
In the third case, Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 215
the Court reemphasized possession and control as the touchstones of agency record status when records are created by a
nonagency. In that case, the publisher of a weekly tax magazine filed a FOIA request with the Department of Justice to
obtain district court tax opinions and final orders used by the
Department in litigating tax cases. 276 In holding that the court
opinions were subject to FOIA disclosure, the Court outlined
a two-part test for determining when records qualify as agency
records. First, an agency must "either create or obtain" the
requested materials,277 and second, the agency must control
those materials at the time the FOIA request is made. 278
For an agency to have control over a record, the Court explained, "the materials [must] have come into the agency's
possession in the legitimate conduct of its official duties," 279 and
must not include personal papers belonging to agency employees.280 The Court noted that if agency records were limited to
those created by the agency, such a definition would violate the
FOIA's purpose of "giving the public access to all nonexempted

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 178.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id. at 182.
492 U.S. 136' (1989).
Id. at 139.
Id. at 144 (quoting Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 182 (1980)).
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id.
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information received by an agency as it carries out its mandate. "281 The Court dismissed the Department of Justice's
argument that materials created outside of an agency should be
accessible under the FOIA only if they were created for the
purpose of assisting agency decision making, holding that the
FOIA did not qualify disclosure on the intent of those who draft
records. 282
2. The FOIA's Definition Applied to Privatized PrisonsKissinger, Forsham, and Tax Analysts have many ramifications
for private prisons operated pursuant to federal government
contracts. A private prison operator creates or is a party to at
least two types of documents. First, the prison management
firm and the agency enter into a contract governing all aspects
of prison operations. This contract may consist of the agency's
RFP and the winning bidder's response, 283 and may include
various amendments over time. 284 Second, most prison managers are required by the contract to submit periodic summaries
and incident reports to the contracting agency. 285 Finally, prison
managers create and maintain their own internal records
system.
The first two types of documents-the contract with the
agency and any periodic or incident reports provided to the
agency-are within the agency's possession and control. According to Forsham, records created by nonagencies become
agency records upon transfer to an agency subject to the
FOIA. 286 Prison records created by a private management firm
that are obtained by a federal agency, therefore, will be subject to FOIA disclosure. However, if the government only
reserves a contractual right to possess prison records but does

281. Id. at 147.
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 2, at 649 n.582 (discussing an amendment to
the CCA's Hamilton County, Tennessee Contract that reduced its general liability
insurance made within two years of the initial contracting); see also HACKETT ET AL.,
supra note 196, at 42 (reporting that Hamilton County has a 32-year contract).
285. See HACKETT ET AL., supra note 196, at 43. Periodic summaries are regular
reports filed on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. Incident reports, on the other
hand, deal with more unusual events at the facility, such as inmate violence, prisoner
death, or attempted escape. Id.
286. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 185-86 (1980); see supra text accompanying
notes 270-74; see also Weisbergv. United States Dep't of Justice, 631F.2d824 CD.C.
Cir. 1980) (holding that copyrighted photographs voluntarily submitted to the Department of Justice by private company are agency records).
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not actually take custody of them, Fors ham mandates that the
documents are not agency records. 287
Even if an agency actually takes possession of certain private prison records, these documents may fall within one of
the FOIA exemptions. The FOIA exemption invoked most
frequently with respect to records transferred to agencies by
government contractors is the fourth exemption (Exemption
4), 288 which protects "trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person [that is] privileged or
confidential. "289 Exemption 4 was designed to protect both the
government and businesses that provide proprietary information to federal agencies by encouraging businesses to submit
voluntarily information upon which the government may rely
in making "intelligent, well informed decisions." 290
Courts have disagreed about the meaning of the term
"trade secrets" as used in Exemption 4. 291 Some have held
that trade secrets encompass any information used in a business that provides a competitive advantage. 292 In 1983, however, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted a more narrow
definition of the term, holding that trade secret includes only
"a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or
device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding,
or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be
the end product of either innovation or substantial effort."293
Under this interpretation, trade secrets must relate directly
to manufacturing or production. This less expansive definition appears to be gaining acceptance. In 1990, it was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which held

287. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 186; see supra text accompanying notes 270-72.
288. See Thomas M. Susman, Risky Business: Protecting Government Con.tract
Information. Under the Freedom of Information. Act, 16 PUB. CONT. L.J. 15, 20 (1986)
(discussing the business information exemption currently codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(4) (1988)).
289. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988) (Exemption 4).
290. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
291. See generally FOIA OVERVIEW, supra note 135, at 104-05 (discussing
conflicting judicial interpretations of Exemption 4).
292. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th
Cir. 1976) (defining "trade secret[s]• to include a "compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives ... an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors").
293. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d
1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 198~).
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that it was more consistent with the FOIA's general purpose
than the broader definition. 294
·
Because prison management generally does not involve the
manufacturing or production of goods, private prison operators
are more likely to invoke the confidential commercial information prong of Exemption 4 than they are the trade secret
prong. 295 Information other than trade secrets falls within
Exemption 4 if it is "(l) commercial or financial, (2) obtained
from a person, and (3) privileged or confidential."296
. Courts have construed "commercial or financial" broadly,
stating that records are possibly commercial if the submitter
could have a conceivable commercial interest in them. 297 Similarly, the requirement that information be obtained from a
"person" is easily satisfied. The term "person" has been held to
include a wide variety of entities other than the U.S. Government, including corporations298 and foreign government agencies.299
Whether information submitted to a federal agency qualifies
as confidential under Exemption 4 has generated substantial
litigation. 30°For almost twenty years, the leading case on this
issue was National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton.301 In National Parks, the District of Columbia Circuit
established that records are confidential within Exemption 4
if disclosure would be likely either "(l) to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or
(2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person from whom the information was obtained."302

294. Anderson v. Department of Health and Human Serv., 907 F.2d 936, 944
(10th Cir. 1990).
295. But cf. Diiulio, supra note 27, at 162 (characterizing prison management
contract proposals as "trade secrets").
296. Public Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1290 (citing National Parks & Conservation Ass'n
v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
297. Id. (citing Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ.
& Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 244 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
298. See, e.g., Allnet Communications Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 800 F. Supp. 984, 988
(D.D.C. 1992).
299. E.g., Comstock Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 464 F. Supp. 804,
806-07 (D.D.C. 1979).
300. E.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Consumers Union v.
Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
301. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
302. Id. at 770 (citation omitted). The court reserved the question as to whether
additional governmental interests, such as compliance or program effectiveness,
might be included under the "confidential" µrong of Exemption 4. Id. at 770 n.17.
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In 1992, the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en bane
revised the National Parks test in Critical Mass Energy Project
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 303 By a vote of seven to
four, 304 the court reaffirmed the general principle of the National Parks test, but limited its application to information that
persons are required to provide to the government. 305 The court
formulated an entirely new test for information voluntarily
submitted to federal agencies, holding that such information is
confidential under Exemption 4 "if it is of a kind that would
customarily not be released to the public by the person from
whom it was obtained. "306 The court reasoned that when an
entity is required to provide information to a federal agency,
Exemption 4 protects the government's interest in ensuring
that the information remains reliable. 307 On the other hand,
when an entity furnishes proprietary information to an agency
voluntarily, Exemption 4 encourages continued cooperation with
the government. 308 According to the court, those who willingly
provide the government with confidential information are likely
to refuse future cooperation if agencies disclose such information to the public. 309 Therefore, commercial information that has
been provided voluntarily to an agency may be withheld without a showing of likely government impairment or substantial
competitive harm to the provider if the information is of the
kind not customarily disclosed to the public. 31°Furthermore, the
agency. invoking Exception 4 bears the burden of proof in
showing the provider's custom. 311
With respect to records furnished by a prison management
firm to an agency, the applicable test under Exemption 4
depends on whether the prison operator submits the information willingly or pursuant to the contract. Presumably, federal
prison management contracts will require operators to file
periodic reports, in which case the two-part National Parks
303. 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
304. The dissenting opinion took a more functional approach to applying Exemption 4 by advocating disclosure of the requested reports "to advance public understanding of the nature and quality of the NRC's [Nuclear Regulatory Commission's]
oversight operations or activities." Id. at 885 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 872.
306. Id. at 879.
307. See id. at 878.
308. Id.
309. Id. (citing National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 768
(D.C. Cir. 1974)).
310. Id.
311. Id.
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test applies. 312 Under the first part of that test, the "impairment" prong, the Critical Mass court recognized that circumstances may exist where disclosure could impair the reliability
of data that are required to be submitted. 313 In other words, an
agency may properly withhold compelled commercial information by demonstrating that FOIA disclosure will diminish the
reliability of what is supplied. For example, an agency could
withhold a prison management firm's monthly reports stipulated by contract if it determined that FOIA disclosure would
result in less accurate reports in the future.
An agency may also withhold compelled confidential information under the second part of the National Parks test, the
"competitive harm" prong, if disclosure would cause substantial competitive injury to the provider. 314 In making this
determination, courts have examined each situation on a caseby-case basis. 315 Actual competitive harm from the disclosure
need not be shown; courts have held that the existence of
competitors, in addition to a showing of the likely substantial
injury, will suffice. 316 Courts have recognized many different
kinds of competitive injury. 317 For example, protected information may include actual cost data and break-even calculations
in a government contract situation. 318 Whether a private
prison operator could rely on the "competitive harm" prong to
justify an agency's withholding of records would depend on the
operator's position in the marketplace and the manner in

312. See supra text accompanying note 302.
313. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871,
878 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
314. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,600, agencies must notify providers of
confidential commercial information that the agency may be required to disclose such
information. The executive order allows providers a reasonable amount of time to
object to disclosure. Exec. Order No. 12,600, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1988).
The Supreme Court has recognized the right of a business to challenge the
disclosure of commercial information under the APA if the release of the records is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317-18 (1979) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706).
315. FOIA OVERVIEW, supra note 135, at 125.
316. Gulf & Western Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
But cf. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878 (suggesting that the commercial threat must
be more significant to withhold compelled information than to withhold voluntary
information because with compelled information, there is no presumptive threat to
government interests).
317. See FOIA OVERVIEW, supra note 135, at 131-32 n.174-83.
318. E.g., Gulf & Western Indus., 615 F.2d at 530.
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which the desired records reveal the conduct or planning of
the operator's business. 319
Even if an agency has a contractual right to certain prison
records, an agency's unexercised ability to compel submission
does not preclude a finding that the records were "voluntarily"
provided to the agency. 320 In Critical Mass, the Institute for
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), a private, nonprofit corporation comprised of nuclear power operators, voluntarily
transferred safety reports to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the NRC's agreement not to release
the reports to third parties without the INPO's consent. 321 Although the INPO was not subject to NRC regulation, its
members were. 322 Therefore, the NRC could have compelled
submission of the safety reports directly from the INPO members; however, the NRC had no need to do so, preferring,
instead, to receive them voluntarily from the INP0. 323 The
requester sought disclosure of the reports under the FOIA,
arguing that the court's new test for voluntarily submitted
information would allow the industry to avoid the FOIA by
"volunteering" information the government already had a right
to receive. 324 The court rejected this argument, saying there is
"no provision in the FOIA that obliges agencies to exercise
their regulatory authority in a manner that will maximize the
amount of information that will be made available to the
public through that Act."325 The court refused to disturb what
it considered to be the NRC's discretion in choosing the best
way to procure the information it required. 326
As a result, theoretically, a prison operator could submit
operations reports on.a voluntary basis, even though its contract gave the agency the power to compel production of the
same reports. By providing the information voluntarily, records

319. See, e.g., Professional Review Org. of Florida v. Department of Health &
Human Serv., 607 F. Supp. 423, 425-26 (D.D.C. 1985) (ruling that records pertaining
to government contract were properly withheld under Exemption 4 because they
related to the manner in which the contractor proposed to conduct business under
contract).
320. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 880.
321. Id. at 874.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See id. at 880.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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would be confidential under Exemption 4 so long as they were
of a kind the operator customarily withheld from the public. 327
Will the initial contract governing prison operations be
subject to disclosure under the FOIA? Although prison management firms elect to respond to RFPs, this fact alone should
not determine whether the resulting contract is submitted
voluntarily for the purposes of the Critical Mass test. Instead,
courts should consider whether the proposal and any additional contract information was required to be submitted by those
bidders who chose to participate in the bidding process. 328
Regardless of whether the Critical Mass test or the National
Parks test is used, prison management contracts probably are
·protected from FOIA disclosure by Exemption 4 because
allowing public scrutiny of a winning proposal would probably
also cause substantial competitive harm to the prison operator. If the contract became available to the public, other prison
management firms would be iri a position to alter their own
procedures or to outbid the operator at contract renewal
time. 329 Furthermore, the agency's ability to attract innovative
prison management proposals could be impaired if winning
proposals were subject to FOIA disclosure. 33°Certain portions
of prison management contracts, however, should be available
under the FOIA for public scrutiny pursuant to the Act's
requirement that "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a
record" be released after application of the appropriate exemptions.331 Segregable contract provisions should include any
matters that, if disclosed, would not provide competitors with
proprietary information. Disclosable terms should include
monitoring and reporting requirements, although no reported
case has so held.
With respect to internal prison records created and maintained by a private management firm, Kissinger and Forsham
establish that such documents will not constitute agency

327. See supra text accompanying notes 309-11.
328. See FOIA OVERVIEW, supra note 135, at 112-19 (discussing the Critical Mass
test and stating the Department of Justice's disclosure guidelines).
329. See, e.g., Gulf & Western Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 530 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (holding that contract information was properly withheld because it would
allow competitors to undercut a contractor's bid).
330. See, e.g., Orion Research, Inc. v. EPA, 615 F.2d 551, 554 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980) (holding that a technical proposal was properly withheld
because disclosure would have "chilling effect" on willingness of potential bidders to
submit proposals).
331. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b) (1988).
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records for FOIA purposes. 332 Internal documents regarding
daily prison operations kept by the private firm are neither
created by nor within the possession of an agency. 333 Even if
the contract gives the agency a right to access or ultimate
possession of these records, Forsham held that an unexercised
right to control records will not suffice to make them agency
records under the FOIA. 334
In Forsham, Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined
by Justice Marshall, argued that agencies should not be allowed
to evade FOIA disclosure on technicalities, such as whether an
agency has possession of documents that are of interest to the
public. 335 Instead, Justice Brennan would consider two factors
in determining when a record constitutes an agency record:
(1) the importance of the record to the public's understanding
of agency action and (2) the nexus between the agency and the
record. 336 Under this test, if access to the record would increase
public awareness of government operations, rather than the
internal affairs of the nonagency, then the legislative intent
behind the FOIA suggests that the record should be available
for public scrutiny. 337 Justice Brennan also premised disclosure
on the requirement that the agency use or rely upon the record
as "part of the regulatory process."338 Justice Brennan, however,
maintained that the majority's possession test for agency record
status undermines the FOIA's purpose because "[g]overnment
by secrecy is no less destructive of democracy if it is carried on
within agencies or within private organizations serving agencies."339
Several commentators also have criticized the Court's reliance on possession as the key to agency record status, suggesting instead that the Court take a broader approach. 340

332. See supra text accompanying notes 251-74.
333. See supra text accompanying note 252.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 270-74.
335. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 188 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 188-89.
337. Id. at 189.
338. Id. at 190.
339. Id. at 190.
340. See, e.g., Marie V. O'Connell, Note, A Control Thst for Determining •Agency
Record" Status Under the Freedom of Information. Act, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 611, 612
(1985) (advocating a control test for determining when a document is an agency
record); Wion, supra note 248, at 1095 (arguing that the definition of agency record
should comport with the full disclosure policy underlying the FOIA); Wright, supra
note 159, at 1242-55 (arguing either that courts should consider private entities that
perform government functions as agencies under the FOIA or that Congress should
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Generally, these commentators agree with Justice Brennan
that an arbitrary possession standard defeats the FOIA's
purpose of allowing public access to government information.
Lower courts, however, have not responded to these arguments.341
Ultimately, prison records created and maintained by private prison management firms are unlikely to be considered
agency records and therefore will not be subject to the FOIA.
This will be the case even if the agency retains a right to
inspect or take possession of the records, as long as actual
custody of the documents stays with the private operator. 342
Records transferred to the agency will be considered agency
records subject to the FOIA; 343 however, they may be protected
from disclosure under Exemption 4. 344 Under the Critical Mass
test, prison records that are submitted voluntarily to an
agency will be exempt if they are of the kind not customarily
provided by the operator to the public. 345 Records that are
required to be provided to the agency will be exempt if their
release would likely impair the agency's ability to obtain
reliable information in the future or cause substantial competitive harm to the provider. 346 Under either test, the contract
between the operator and the agency will be at least partially
exempt from disclosure. 347

"
amend the FOIA to broaden the definition of agency records). But cf. Walterscheid,
supra note 244, at 59 (suggesting that failure to restrict the definition of agency
records to exclude federally funded research data in the possession of nonagencies
undermines American economic competitiveness).
341. See, e.g., Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975
F.2d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (explaining that the FOIA does not obligate agencies
to maximize information available to the public under the Act); see also Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Secretary of Agriculture, 813 F. Supp. 882, 891-92 (D.D.C. 1993)
(citing Critical Mass for the proposition that regulations allowing a private entity to
retain possession of plans "on-siten and thus not disclose the information does not
violate the FOIA).
342. See supra notes 263-74 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 303-11 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 314-19 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 325-31 and accompanying text.
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
Over the past fifteen years, the FOIA has been criticized for
subjecting private entities to what is arguably unfair scrutiny
by competitors, shareholders, lawyers, and others who use the
Act for private gain rather than for the public good. 348 Critics
have described the FOIA as "a lawful tool of industrial espionage,"349 used by savvy business executives and their corporate
attorneys to file thousands ofFOIA requests annually in order
to learn what their competition, rather than their government,
is up to. 350 Such critics claim that the business community's
self-serving use of the FOIA defeats the Act's purpose and
violates the privacy interests of nongovernmental entities that
are required to submit confidential information to the government.351 One commentator recently suggested a remedy that
would have the Supreme Court limit FOIA disclosure to
records dealing with governmental, rather than private, activities.352
Privatization of federal prisons presents the flip side of this
same argument. While the FOIA may mandate disclosure of
too much information concerning the nongovernmental activities of private entities, it mandates disclosure of too little
information when private companies perform governmental

348. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to
Know: The "Central Purpose• of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV.
41, 43-44 (1994) (discussing the use of the FOIA by business persons to access
information on competitors).
349. Stephen S. Madsen, Note, Protecting Confidential Business Information from
Federal Agency Disclosure After Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REv.109, 113
(1980) (discussing the use of the FOIA by businesspersons to access information on
competitors).
350. Most FOIA requests are made by businesses, including foreign corporations,
seeking information about their competitors. See, e.g., MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN,
supra note 122, at 4 70 (finding that more than half of all FOIA requests are filed by
businesses seeking information about government regulations and their competitors);
Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils
and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 665-67 (1984)
(reporting that four out of five FOIA requests are made by business executives or
their attorneys).
351. See Cate et al., supra note 348, at 44.
352. Id. at 67-68; see also Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 189 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("If, for instance, the significance of the record is limited to understanding the workings of the nonagency, the public has no FOIA-protected interest
in access.").
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functions, such as the operation and management of correctional facilities. When a federal agency delegates a public
function to a private contractor, the agency, in effect, frustrates the purpose of the FOIA. Records created through the
performance of a public duty that would have been available
to the public but for the delegation become insulated from
disclosure by virtue of the contractor's nonagency status. This
circumvention of the Act is especially troublesome in the
context of private prisons, where prisoners' liberty interests
and well-being are at stake. According to the accountability
principle, 353 private prisons should be just as accountable as
public prisons. To meet this goal, the prisoners, the press, and
the public must be able to scrutinize the activities of private
contractors, just as they already may scrutinize public correctional activities under the FOIA. The remainder of this Article
considers three approaches to the accountability problem and
concludes that Congress should enact legislation subjecting
federal prison records that are created and maintained by
private management firms to disclosure under the FOIA as
part of a comprehensive program to guard against contractor
abuse.

A. Insisting on Intensive Government
Monitoring of Private Prisons ·

As noted earlier in this Article, both critics and supporters of
prison privatization agree that private prison operators must be
held accountable for the way they perform their delegated
duties. 354 Various monitoring schemes have been proposed, most
involving document review and on-site prison inspections
conducted by government representatives. 355 For example,
Professor Robbins's Model Contract calls for an employee of the
contracting agency to have access to prison facilities and all
records kept by the contractor at all times. 356 The Model Contract further requires the contractor to maintain all records

353.
354.
355.
356.

See supra text accompanying notes 3-4, 67-91.
See supra text accompanying notes 3-4, 67-91.
See, e.g., Allen, supra note 3, at 39; Keating, supra note 3, at 144-46.
Robbins, supra note 2, at 752.
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required by the American Correctional Association's standards
for facility accreditation and the contracting agency. 357
If the . prison management firm grants the correctional
agency complete access to prison records, as the Model Contract requires, the lack of public access to these documents
through the FOIA may not be a significant issue. After all, any
records actually transferred to an agency will be disclosable
under the FOIA. 358 Private contractors, wary of contract
renewal time, are likely to submit only subjective, self-serving,
or inoffensive reports to the contracting agency. 359 But as long
as the government can review all other internal records,
accountability, arguably, has been sufficiently guaranteed.
This analysis presents several problems. First, it raises
questions as to how effective a monitor the government will
be. The government's right to examine internal prison documents is meaningful only if administrators in fact review the
records, and take action to correct any problems revealed upon
review. Because of budgetary constraints, many agencies are
understaffed and thus, perusing docume~ts and inspecting
private facilities is a low priority. 36° Constant supervision of
prison operations and records, including any on-site monitoring, is expensive. 361 An agency therefore has little incentive to
convert cost savings into monitoring expenses.
Second, the private correctional firm that procures an initial
contract with· the government may become absorbed with its
responsibilities. 362 Once the government correctional agency
has contracted for correctional services with the private sector,
it may no longer have ready access to the facilities or the staff
necessary to resume prison operations should the private
357. Id.
358. See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
359. For example, in News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser
Architectural Group, 596 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1992), a newspaper sought access under
the Florida Public Records Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. 119 (West 1985), to files concerning
the construction of public schools. The files were in the possession of an architectural
firm hired by a school district. The newspaper wanted access to the firm's internal
records because it claimed that the documents provided to the school district by the
firm were merely self-serving pronouncements. See also Susman, supra note 288, at
29 (advising that to protect contract information from FOIA disclosure, a contractor
should provide for the release of "sanitized, composite, or innocuous information
where feasible•).
360. ·See Keating, supra note 3, at 146.
361. E.S. SAVAS, PRlvATIZING THE PuBLIC SECTOR: How TO SHRINK GoVERNMENT
153 (1982) (estimating monitoring costs to be one to five percent of the total contract
price).
.
362. Brakel, supra note 21, at 31.
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operator prove unsatisfactory. 363 Having invested in the startup costs of operating a prison, the initial operator will be able
to out-bid competing management firms. Eventually, this price
advantage could permanently drive away the competition. 364
Without alternate prison operators from which to choose, the
contracting agency will be hard pressed to remove the initial
contractor. Furthermore, by terminating a prison management
contract and replacing a private operator for misfeasance, the
agency itself could receive negative publicity. Rather than
being "tarred with the same brush," the contracting agency
might prefer not to monitor prison operations too closely. 365
Third, government monitors are at risk of "capture" by the
private management firms which they are employed to oversee.366 Whether as a result of a contractor's "overt corruption
or subtle cooptation,"367 a government regulator may turn a
blind eye to contract violations or other abuses. Prison monitors are particularly prone to this risk because many private
prison managers hire government employees to staff their
operations. In 1994, for example, each of the CCA's nineteen
American prison facilities was run by a former government
corrections employee. 368 When an official contract monitor
knows that he may have a future employment opportunity
with the private firm being monitored, forging a good relationship with the potential employer takes precedence over
insisting on contract compliance.
Even if government monitors proved competent, honest, and
incorruptible, exclusive state monitoring of private prisons
effectively extinguishes the public's ability to observe and
affect an important part of the criminal justice system. 369
Private prison operators insist that they can manage prisons
more effectively than the government, in part because private
firms are free from political pressures and bureaucratic red
tape. 370 Yet some governmental requirements such as the
FOIA safeguard important public interests. In the FOIA,

363. See Gentry, supra note 77, at 357-58 (describing how a private firm that
secures an initial contract can thwart the government's access to a competitive
market).
364. Id. at 358.
365. Id. at 359.
366. Id. at 360.
367. Keating, supra note 3, at 146.
368. CCA FACILITY PROFILES, supra note 115, at 1-6.
369. See infra text accompanying note 404.
370. Diiulio, supra note 27, at 166.
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Congress made a legislative determination that the government should not be trusted to run its affairs without public
oversight. 371 By removing from public view records pertaining
to federal private prisons, federal correctional agencies have
created the very situation that the FOIA was intended to
avoid.

B. Amend the FOIA to Apply to Private Entities
That Perform Agency Functions
One way to ensure that the public has access to the internal
records of federal privatized prisons would be for Congress to
amend the FOIA's definition of "agency" to include private
entities that perform significant agency functions. 372 The open
records acts of several states already apply to private organizations that act on behalf of state agencies. 373 This solution,
however, involves several drawbacks.
One major difficulty with amending the FOIA in this way
relates to the scope of the amendment. If the definition of
agency is expanded to apply to private organizations that
contract with the government, then the FOIA will be enlarged
dramatically and will include all private government contractors. The costs of increased administrative compliance and
additional FOIA requests generated by such an amendment
would be immense. In Forsham, the Court noted that applying
the FOIA to documents which the government has "contractual access" would create a class of records of "staggering"
proportions. 374
Additionally, by making a private contractor an agency
under the FOIA, all of the contractor's records would be
371. See supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
372. See infra text accompanying notes 404-07. The Supreme Court could accomplish the same result by ruling that for purposes of the FOIA, private prison
management firms constitute agencies, or that such firms' records are agency records.
However, in Forsham u. Harris, the Court refused to extend either definition to
private grantees, indicating that it would be inappropriate for the Court to do so
when Congress had not. 445 U.S. 169, 179-80 (1980).
373. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(2) (West 1985) (defining "[a]gency" as
including any "public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or business
entity acting on behalf ofany public agency"); GA. CODE ANN.§ 50-18-70(a) (Michie
1994) (defining "[p]ublic records• as records "received or maintained by a private
person or entity on behalf of a public office or agency•).
374. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 186 n.17.
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subject to disclosure unless the statute limited disclosure to
materials created in connection with the performance of a
government function. If the definition is amended to restrict
FOIA coverage to private entities that perform "governmental
functions," then either Congress, the courts, or both will have
to define that term to create a clear division between those
contractors whose records will be subject to the FOIA and
those whose records will not. To make daily decisions about
FOIA requests, agencies need reliable, unambiguous standards.
Formulating a practical definition of government function will
not be easy. Although it may appear relatively straightforward
that a private entity hired by an agency to provide prison
management services is performing a governmental function, 375
the result in other contracting situations will not be so clear.
For example, consider the situation in Forsham where a private
entity conducted federally funded research regarding the safety
and effectiveness of antidiabetes drugs. 376 The data generated
by the study were used by the FDA to regulate the use and
labelling of the drugs. 377 Was the research grantee in Forsham
performing a governmental function? It could be argued that,
at least in the modern era, citizens depend on the federal
government to ensure the quality and safety of drugs. In the
study at issue in Forsham, however, a fifteen million dollar
federal grant generated fifty-five million records. 378 Federally
funded research and development produces several billion
records per year. 379 FOIA compliance is already a drain on the
federal budget,380 and it is unrealistic to believe that Congress
would amend the FOIA when such an amendment would pose
an administrative burden. 381
375. See supra text accompanying notes 239-43.
376. For a discussion of the facts presented in Forsham, see supra text accompanying notes 166-72.
377. 445 U.S. at 172.
378. Id.
379. Walterscheid, supra note 244, at 49.
380. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services alone responded
to more than 121,000 FOIA requests in 1987 at a cost of more than $8.1 million. Cate
et al., supra note 348, at 50.
Critics maintain that the benefits provided by the FOIA do not justify its price.
For example, 15 years ago, Justice Antonin Scalia described the FOIA as the "Taj
Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of CostBenefit Analysis Ignored." Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No
Clothes, REGULATION, MarJApr. 1982, at 14, 15.
381. Other predicted consequences of enlarging the FOIA to apply to private
contractors acting as federal research grantees include the "righteous wrath of the
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Florida's experience of bringing private entities that perform
government functions under its public records statute illustrates the problems that can arise when formulating such a
definition. In 1975, the Florida legislature amended its Public
Records Act to apply to any private entity acting "on behalf of
any public agency."382 The amendment was enacted to prevent
the state from contracting with private firms, thereby avoiding
the statute's disclosure requirements. 383 The statute defined
public records as documents made "in connection with the
transaction of official business by any agency. "384
Despite this relatively plain language, Florida courts have
struggled to determine which private entities are covered by
the Act. In 1989, for example, a Florida appeals court held
that a private towing company under city contract was performing a governmental function and, therefore, was subject
to the disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act. 385 In
other cases, however, Florida courts have looked to federal
case law to interpret the amendment. 386 As a result, in 1992,
the Florida Supreme Court held that an architectural firm
hired by a local school board to provide services in connection
with the construction of public schools was not acting "on
behalf of" a public agency. 387 In reaching its decision, the court
relied on earlier Florida cases that had applied criteria used
by federal courts to identify when a private organization had
become an "agency" under the FOIA. 388 The court reasoned
that the school board had not created the architectural firm,
nor did it control the firm's "activit[ies] or judgment."389 Furthermore, the court held that the firm was not performing a

university community" and the availability of American technology to foreign requesters, resulting in a threat to U.S. economic competitiveness. Walterscheid, supra note
244, at 53, 55-59.
382. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(2) (West 1994).
383. See Times Publishing Co. v. City of St. Petersburg, 558 So. 2d 487, 494 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
384. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(1) (West 1994).
385. Fox v. News-Press Publishing Co., 545 So. 2d 941 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
386. See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 429
So. 2d 343, 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); see also Marguerite L. Robinson, Note,
Detectives Following the Wrong Clues: Identification of Private Entities Subject to
Florida's Public Records Law, 22 STETSON L. REV. 785, 790-91 (1993) (discussing the
application of federal FOIA case law to the Florida Public Records Act).
387. News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group,
596 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Fla. 1992).
388. Id. at 1031.
389. Id. at 1032.
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government function because it had not been delegated any
decision-making authority by the school district. 390
By applying federal criteria inappropriate for interpreting
the Florida Public Records Act amendment, the state court
neatly sidestepped the purpose of the amendment. 391 The case
highlights the application and definitional problems that could
arise upon any amendment to the FOIA that attempts to
extend it to private prison management firms. Nothing guarantees that the federal courts, like the Florida Supreme Court,
will not look to old case law to interpret a new amendment.
Although a FOIA amendment applying the Act to private
prison managers could subject internal prison records to FOIA
disclosure, this expansion will not be enough alone to ensure
accountability. Just as government monitoring by itself does
not provide adequate oversight of federal privatized prisons,392
neither does a public right of access to internal records, standing alone. Adequate monitoring must combine several techniques to safeguard prisoners' liberty interests and to protect
against contractor abuses. 393

C. Enact Federal Enabling Legislation Governing the
Conditions Under Which Federal Agencies Can Delegate the
Responsibility for Prison Management to Private Entities
Different methods have been proposed to ensure the accountability of privately operated prisons, including government monitoring and inspections,394 public and press visits to
prison facilities, 395 public access to prison records, 396 and
application of heightened standards of judicial review. 397 Even

,

390. Id.
391. For a critical analysis of Schwab, see generally Robinson, supra note 386.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 360-65.
393. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 3, at 152 (calling for a "rich mixture" of monitoring approaches in private prisons to ensure accountability).
394. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 2, at 752 (proposing a model contract which
requires an on-site monitor with access to all areas and records of the facility).
395. See, e.g., id. at 752-53 (Model Contract § 6(B)) (providing for public access
to private correctional facilities). ·
. 396. See, e.g., Gentry, supra note 77, at 363-65 (recommending public access to
private prison records combined with a system of fines and bonuses imposed on
private prison operators).
397. David N. Wecht, Note, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of
Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 815, 834-37 (1987).
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economic incentives and disincentives such as bonuses and
fines 398 and a royalty system based on recidivism rates have
been suggested to align more closely the government's and the
private operator's interests. 399 While this Article has focused
on the FOIA status of internal private prison records, it does
not suggest that public access to contractor documents alone
will ensure accountability. As noted earlier, effective monitoring involves many different means of observation and oversight.
In the federal context, however, nothing provides a set of
uniform standards to guarantee that private prison operators
are subjected to a minimum level of accountability. There is no
uniformity because, unlike state legislatures that have turned
prison operations over to private managers, Congress has not
enacted legislation authorizing federal correctional agencies to
privatize their facilities. 400 This lack of legislative guidance
means that federal agencies are free to use their discretion in
setting, amending, or ignoring accountability standards in
their contracts. Although a federal correctional agency may
provide for a sophisticated monitoring system in its contracts
today, nothing ensures that provisions for accountability will
appear in future contracts.
This Article proposes that Congress pass legislation requiring
that all prison records created and maintained by a private
prison operator be subject to disclosure under the FOIA. By
using the FOIA's existing framework, privacy interests of
federal prisoners and prison personnel, as well as legitimate
confidential commercial information belonging to prison managers, would still be protected by FOIA exemptions. In this way,
prisoners and other FOIA requesters would be entitled to the
same procedural remedies and safeguards that currently exist
under the FOIA.
Additionally, such legislation should limit mandated disclosure to materials that pertain to the operation of private
prison facilities. Such a limit would ensure that the legislation
comports with the FOIA's purpose of providing access only to
those records concerning important matters of public policy.
Without this limitation, FOIA requesters could use the legisla-

398. Gentry, supra note 77, at 360-63.
399. Kenneth L. Avio, On Private Prisons: An Economic Analysis of the Model
Contract and Model Statute for Private Incarceration, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 265, 294-95 (1991).
400. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
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tion to uncover information about prison management firms
that bears no relation to the performance of a governmental
function.
Congress could leave the terms of FOIA cost and compliance
to negotiation between the government and the contractor.
However, because the agency already will have established
FOIA guidelines and be familiar with the Act's administrative
requirements, it would make more sense to require the agency
to carry out the task. By giving the agency the administrative
burdens of indexing, searching for, and producing records, the
private contractor will be less able to conceal or overlook
requested documents.
A workable solution would be for the statute to provide that
all records regarding the operations of a federal privatized
prison be deemed as belonging to the contracting agency, and
to give the agency the responsibility of making these records
available to the public in accordance with the FOIA. Compliance with the FOIA is a "hidden cost"401 that agencies already
bear in operating public prisons. The cost of providing access
to a private operator's records should not be substantially
higher than what agencies already expend with respect to
these public facilities.
By enacting legislation governing private prison operations,
Congress will have an opportunity to address other important
issues, besides access to records, that are raised by prison
privatization. Privatization frequently has been criticized as
undemocratic because it provides little room for citizen input
to the creation of public policy. 402 Congress can add a measure
of political accountability to the privatiZation equation by
codifying policies regarding prisoner classification decisions,
disciplinary sanctions, the use of force by private operators,
determinations of good time for prisoners, and questions of
contractor liability. 403
The need for legislation providing a right of access to private
prison records and facilities is especially acute because of Supreme Court decisions denying the existence of a First Amend-

401. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
402. Al Bilik, Privatization: Defacing the Community, 43 LAB. L.J., 338, 342
(1992); Field, supra note 63, at 670.
403. For a general discussion of these issues, see Robbins, supra note 2 (reviewing
a broad range of policy issues regarding private incarceration), and Woolley, supra
note 4 (focusing on Pennsylvania legislation and providing a guide to corrections
officers, government administrators, and legislators).
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ment right of access to government-operated prisons. 404 In one
of these cases, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., the Court, in a four to
three decision, rejected a television station's claim of a First
Amendment right of access to a county jail. 405 Writing for the
plurality, Chief Justice Burger stated that the issue of access
was a legislative matter to be resolved by the political process.406 Although different interests would be presented in a
case involving a private prison, the Court would likely consider
access to privatized prisons also a matter for the legislature.
If so, unless Congress authorizes a public right of access to
private prisons, citizens will lack any legally enforceable right
to information regarding this important aspect of the criminal
justice system. Like administrators prior to enactment of the
FOIA, private prison operators
be free to ex:ercise their
"official grace" regarding whether, when, and how to communicate with citizens and the media. 407 Although a detailed
analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, if Congress refuses
to implement a legislative solution establishing public accountability of privatized corrections, the Supreme Court should
revisit the prison cases and mandate a constitutional right of
access to private prisons for the public and the press under the
First Amendment.

will

CONCLUSION

Prison privatization may prove to be all that its supporters
claim: a way for the government to construct prisons more
quickly, to manage prisons more economically, and to operate
prisons with more flexibility, resulting in cheaper, more effective inmate care. No matter what arguments exist against
private prisons, their existence of private prisons is a fact oflife

404. These "prison cases• include Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978)
(holding that a county sheriffs restrictive policy on access to county jail did not
violate the First Amendment); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974)
(upholding a federal prison ban on media interviews with specific prisoners); and Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding a state prison ban on media interviews
with specific prisoners). For critical analysis of the prison cases, see Leonard G.
Leverson, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Restrict Access to Prisons: An
Historical Re-examination, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409 (1983).
405. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 1.
406. Id. at 14-16.
407. See CROSS, supra note 123, at vii-xi.
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in federal corrections. Government reliance on the private
sector to provide correctional services is a trend that undoubtedly will continue.
Regardless of whether they are public or private, all prisons
are secretive places. Along with secrecy comes the potential for
abuse. Past experience reveals the importance of public oversight of prisons to protect the safety, well-being, and liberty
interests of prisoners, as well as to ensure the proper expenditure of public funds. The accountability principle demands that
private prisons must be at least as accountable to the public as
government facilities are.
In at least one significant way, however, privatized federal
facilities are even more impenetrable than government-operated
prisons. Although records promulgated by federal correctional
agencies are subject to public disclosure under the FOIA,
documents maintained by private prison operators are largely
inaccessible under the Act. By contracting with private prison
operators, federal correctional agencies shield what otherwise
would have been public information from public scrutiny. This
frustrates the FOIA's purpose of guaranteeing the public the
right to monitor government· activities.
The Supreme Court has stated that "it is important that
society's criminal process 'satisfy the appearance of justice'. ..
and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing
people to observe it. "4os Congress can best ensure that federal
privatized correctional facilities "satisfy the appearance of
justice" by enacting legislation that subjects private operators
to uniform standards of accountability. These standards must
include a right of public access to records created and maintained by private prison operators as part of a comprehensive
system of monitoring and oversight. Whatever public benefits
may accrue from prison privatization are not worth the risks
posed to prisoners and the criminal justice system by "the
return of government secrecy through the agency back door."409

408. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
409. O'Connell, supra note 340, at 627.

